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The focus of my research is dynamic macroeconomics and how the economy re-
sponds to changes in government policy. During the last 30 years, the sovereign
bond market in emerging economies has grown considerably and many large scale
defaults were observed. Existing models of sovereign debt are unable to jointly ex-
plain the debt to output ratios and the default frequency in these countries. In the
first chapter, to address this puzzle, I propose a standard small open economy model
with the addition that the government transits through different political states and
these transitions cannot be directly observed by lenders. Moreover, after a default,
the government chooses when to renegotiate and it bargains with the lenders over
the recovery rate. I show that government reputation and endogenous periods of ex-
clusion and recovery rates play a crucial role in explaining this phenomenon. In the
vii
second chapter, I use a dynamic political economy model to evaluate whether the
observed rise in wage inequality and decrease in median to mean wages can explain
the increase in transfers to low earnings quintiles and increase in effective tax rates
for high earnings quintiles in the U.S. over the past several decades. I conduct a
welfare analysis by contrasting the solution from the political mechanism with those
from a sequential utilitarian mechanism, as well as mechanisms with commitment.
Finally, the third chapter focuses on explaining the dynamics of firms. I ask whether
an entry/exit model like that pioneered by Hopenhayn (1992, Econometrica) with a
capital accumulation decision and non-convex costs of adjustment can generate size
and age dependence like that found in the data. In particular, conditional on age,
growth, employment creation and destruction and volatility are decreasing in size.
Moreover, conditional on size, growth, employment creation and destruction and
volatility are decreasing in age. The main point of this chapter is to demonstrate
that a model with no financial frictions parameterized to match the investment regu-
larities of U.S. establishments is able to account for the simultaneous dependence of
industry dynamics on size (once we condition on age) and on age (once we condition
on size).
To explain how the economy responds and conduct welfare analysis either
one has to find natural experiments or one has to build computational models and
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Debt Repayment in Emerging
Economies
1.1 Introduction
Evidence shows that emerging economies that repeatedly defaulted on their external
obligations are still able to accumulate considerable amounts of debt. Table 1.1
displays the average government debt to output ratio for countries that defaulted
in the last decade. The average country, among emerging economies, experienced
3 defaults every 100 years and sustains an average external debt to output ratio
around 58%.1 One of the primary goals of a quantitative model of emerging market
1Cases considered are defaults and/or debt restructurings (including reschedulings) in distressed
circumstances involving external creditors. Defaults triggered by wars, revolutions, occupations
and state disintegrations are excluded. All restructurings and defaults refer to federal or central
government distress. Previous defaults since 1824 or year of independence (Pakistan 1947, Indonesia
1949, Ukraine 1991, Uruguay 1830, Grenada 1974). The debt to output ratio is computed using
quarterly output and the stock of debt corresponds to external public debt with private creditors.
1
Table 1.1: Government Debt to Output Ratios and Default Episodes
Gov.Debt/GNP # of last default Gov.Debt/GNP (%)
Country 1970-2005 (%) defaults year t year t− 1
Russia 51 3 1998 80
Pakistan 9 2 1999 13
Ecuador 122 7 1999 200
Ukraine 24 2 2000 41
Argentina 88 5 2001 103
Indonesia 40 3 2002 28
Paraguay 28 7 2003 39
Uruguay 79 6 2003 146
Grenada 41 1 2004 208
Venezuela 98 8 2005 75
Average 58 4 93
Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance II ;
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005); and Standard & Poor’s (2007).
debt should be to generate the observed frequency of default in an equilibrium
that sustains a level of external obligations similar to those displayed in Table 1.1.
However, this remains a puzzle. Important recent contributions in the sovereign debt
literature, such as Arellano (2007), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Yue (2007), are
unable to account for both debt to output ratios and recurrent default events.2,3 In
this paper, I ask whether a model of government reputation where the risk of default
2Arellano (2007), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Yue (2007) are calibrated to Argentina and
predict that, at the observed default frequency, the debt to quarterly output ratio should be 7.3%
in the work of Arellano (2007); 18% in the case of Aguiar and Gopinath (2006); and 9.7% for Yue
(2007).
3This was also a challenge in recent studies of unsecured consumer debt such as Chatterjee,
Corbae, Nakajima and Rios Rull (2007, Econometrica) because high frequency of default makes
unsecured debt very expensive which deters consumer borrowing. In addition to earnings shocks,
and in order to jointly match the level of consumer debt and the default frequency, they consider
unexpected medical expenses and private life-events (such as divorce) as a possible trigger for
default.
2
and debt renegotiation are endogenous, that accounts for the default frequency, can
generate a higher debt to output ratio.
During the last two decades the sovereign debt market has become increas-
ingly competitive and it can be characterized as follows.4 First, defaults are associ-
ated with “bad times” of the economy. Second, defaults are always followed by some
form of repayment. Third, sovereign ratings, viewed as a measure of the willingness
to pay of the sovereign, play an important role in determining countries access to
international credit markets and are highly correlated with countries’ interest rates.
Fourth, countries do not access capital markets while the default situation lasts.
Based on the previous facts, I develop a model of sovereign debt, default
and government reputation where the country is subject to income fluctuations. In
this economy, an altruistic government makes the borrowing decisions and there is
no commitment technology to repay the debt. Following Cole, Dow and English
(1995), the government transits through two political states that affect how the
government values the future. The state evolves as a Markov process rather than
being permanent. According to these states we can classified the government as
“aligned”, if the government discounts the future at the same rate as consumers, or
“misaligned”, if the government discounts the future at a higher rate. The sovereign
and risk neutral competitive financial intermediaries trade one period non-contingent
bonds. A government default leads to financial autarky. However, the lenders and
the government can renegotiate over debt a reduction. Only after repayment of
the renegotiated debt can a government regain access to capital markets. Debt
recovery rates are determined in a Nash bargaining mechanism consistent with the
information structure.
The parameters of the model are estimated via simulated method of mo-
ments. In order to make a fair comparison of the results in this paper to those
4See Kletzer (1994), Eaton and Fernandez (1995), Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006a) and
Section 1.1.2 below.
3
in previous studies in the sovereign debt literature, the moments chosen for the
estimation are similar to the moments used in the calibration of Arellano (2007),
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Yue (2007).5 It is important to note that the set
of targeted moments does not include the debt to output ratio. After the estimation
is done, and as a test of the model, I ask whether the mean debt to output ratio
is consistent with the values presented in Table 1.1. I show that, at the observed
default frequency, the combination of government reputation and endogenous recov-
ery rates generates a debt to output ratio around 40% that is between 2 to 5 times
higher than previous models in the literature.
One of the contributions of the paper is to develop a framework that is
consistent with how the sovereign debt market for emerging economies works. In-
ternational lenders learn about the political state from government borrowing and
repayment behavior and summarize its reputation in the probability of a govern-
ment being of the aligned type. I show that we can identify this probability with the
sovereign rating. In equilibrium, the aligned government (hereafter the a − type),
has a lower probability of default and borrow less than the misaligned government
(hereafter the m − type). Thus, a default decision or taking more debt lowers the
sovereign rating. Moreover, the a − type government has a higher probability of
entering the renegotiation stage than the m − type government. This implies that
after repayment the model generates an upgrade in the sovereign rating. Reputa-
tion becomes valuable because the terms of international loans depend not only on
economic fundamentals, but also on the sovereign rating.
Another important contribution of this paper is that incorporates both sovereign
default and debt renegotiation into a dynamic general equilibrium model with pri-
vate information. Post-default renegotiation and the endogenous determination of
exclusion periods have important effects over the incentives to default. However,
5As in these papers, I also base my analysis on the sovereign debt of Argentina.
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most of the recent papers in the literature, except Yue (2007), have considered zero
recovery rates and exogenous exclusion periods after a default. Compared to a
world with zero recovery rates (the environment of Arellano (2007) and Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006)), interest rates at a particular debt level are lower because lenders
have an expected recovery value that might be different from zero. Second, en-
dogenous recovery rates introduce a level of contingency to debt contracts (they are
function of the state of the economy in the repayment period) and make borrowing
more appealing. As opposed to Yue (2007), countries are not forced to renegotiate
in the default period and recovery rates are determined in the repayment period.
Consistent with the data, countries have stronger incentives to repay in good times
(see Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007)).
The information structure and the endogenous determination of default penal-
ties (recovery rates and periods of exclusion) are essential ingredients to obtain the
main result. In section 1.6, I show that a model with full information and zero re-
covery rates generates an equilibrium debt to output ratio that is only 34% of that
generated by the benchmark model. In addition, a model with full information and
endogenous recovery generates a debt to output ratio that is only 72% of the ratio
in the model with private information. In these models, reputation has no value
(political states are observable), thus a repayment decision per se has no effect on
future prices.
Emerging economies are characterized by volatile business cycles. Interest
rates are countercyclical and highly volatile. Moreover, the current account is coun-
tercyclical and positively correlated with interest rates. At the estimated param-




The pioneering work on sovereign debt and reputation is Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
In their model, countries were permanently excluded from credit markets after a de-
fault, so country’s incentive to make repayments is to preserve its future access
to foreign lenders. Bulow and Rogoff (1989) state that if markets are complete,
sovereign debt can be sustained in equilibrium, only if it is possible to impose sanc-
tions over a country after a default. I choose to model debt as a one period uncon-
tingent bonds and countries are not allowed to borrow or save during default periods
so their argument does not apply in this context. Moreover, the empirical evidence
rejects the imposition of sanctions as a possible explanation of the existence of debt
with no commitment.
This paper is closely related with Cole, Dow and English (1995) and Phelan
(2006). They also study models with heterogenous agents where a players’ type
changes over time and is private information. Cole, et. al. (1995) focused on
nineteenth-century bond defaults and subsequent resumptions. The level of debt
and the repayment amount after a default are fixed. Phelan (2006) studies the
effects of government reputation and shows that the unique equilibrium has the
opportunistic government following a mixed strategy. Chatterjee, Corbae and Rios
Rull (2007) also consider an environment with heterogenous borrowers and private
information. They focus on unsecured consumer debt and the welfare consequences
of imposing legal restrictions on the length of time that adverse events can remain on
individual’s credit record. The credit scoring technology implemented in this paper
is similar to theirs. Another related paper is Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005). They
study a model of sovereign debt with adverse selection where governments differ
in their patience level but the borrowing level is exogenously given and countries
have continuous access to credit markets. Moreover, they study equilibria where the
government with a lower discount rate always default.
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Recent quantitative models have related business cycles and sovereign debt in
environments where the government cannot commit to pay back. Besides the models
of Arellano (2007), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Yue (2007) referenced before,
other papers employed similar environments. In particular, Hatchondo, Martinez
and Sapriza (2007) consider an environment where the government type can change
but they assume zero debt recoveries and no exclusion from credit markets after a
default. In their paper, government types are public information and debt contracts
are contingent on types similar to the full information specification of the benchmark
model. Amador (2003) and Cuadra and Sapriza (2006) study sovereign default in
a setup in which different government types alternate in power. The types disagree
on the optimal allocation of resources within each period but do not differ in their
willingness to pay, and therefore they receive the same treatment from lenders.
Political instability affects the equilibrium spread through its effect on the weight
on future utility flows. Another related work is the paper by Chang (2007). He
studies the simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises in an
open economy model. Political crises accompany default in equilibrium because of
an information transmission conflict between the government and the public.
As in Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007), the benchmark model predicts delay
in reaching an agreement after a default. In the model studied in this paper, consis-
tent with the evidence they show, incentives to repay are stronger in good times. In
Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007) the time elapsed from the default period to a return
to markets is also endogenous. However, their model predicts periods of exclusion
potentially long. Pitchford and Wright (2007) analyze what is the optimal tradeoff
between efficient borrowing ex ante and the cost of default ex post. They present a
model of sovereign borrowing default coupled with an explicit model of debt restruc-
turing process in which delay arises due to both creditor holdout and free-riding on
negotiation effort.
7
Default does not arise in equilibrium and the incentive to default is higher
during good times in papers such as Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996),
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and Kehoe and Perri (2002). This paper differs from
the literature on endogenous incomplete markets because in the model presented
here default occurs in equilibrium and incentives to default are higher during low
income realizations.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.1.2 I present a
description of the sovereign debt market in emerging economies. In section 1.2, I
describe the environment. In section 1.3, I describe and define the equilibrium. Sec-
tion 1.4, presents the computation algorithm and the estimation procedure. Finally,
in sections 1.5 through 1.8, I explain the main results.
1.1.2 The Emerging Economies Bond Market
During the past decades the market for sovereign lending has shift from syndicated
bank loans towards bonds and has opened up the market to larger number of in-
vestors. Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of government debt by type (bonds vs bank
loans) as a fraction of total government debt in emerging economies as a fraction of
total debt. We observe a sharp decrease of the bank debt towards sovereign bonds
specially since the end of the 1980’s.
Unlike loan restructurings, no formal mechanisms for sovereign bond rene-
gotiation, or workouts, have been established. Markets have addressed the issues
of bond workouts on a case-by-case basis, and essentially without intervention by
creditor countries or multilateral institutions (see Chuhan and Sturzenegger (2005)).
Two approaches to sovereign bond workouts have been followed: voluntary and in-
voluntary (or concerted). Voluntary exchanges between a government and lenders
typically re-profile debt service, but do not lower the nominal value of debt and
impose small net present value reductions. A concerted renegotiation will involve a
8
Figure 1.1: Sovereign Debt in Emerging Economies by Type


























Source: World Bank (2007).
reduction in the net present value of the investment for investors. Table 1.2 displays
the recovery rates and periods of exclusion during the most recent sovereign defaults.
The sovereign ratings of these countries were always downgraded to the state of Se-
lective Default (SD) or Default (D) until the repayment of the renegotiated debt.
The recovery rates correspond to the difference between the present value of the
new instruments versus the present value of the old instruments (see Sturzenegger
and Zettelmeyer (2005) and Moody’s (2006) for a comprehensive explanation).6
In response to the increased demand for the evaluation of creditworthiness,
several agencies such as Moodys and Standard & Poor’s have developed expertise in
estimating country risk.7 Sovereign ratings have become an important component
of the sovereign debt market. Standard & Poor’s (2006) reports that a sovereign
6While the renegotiation mechanism is different, recovery rates for rated corporate defaults are
similar. Moody’s (2006) documents that the average senior unsecured bond recovery rate is 58.3%
in 2006.
7By 1970 S&P’s rated only two countries, U.S. and Canada. The number of rated sovereigns
rose to 12 in 1980, all rated ’AAA’. From that point on, there was a marked increase in the number
of ratings and an expansion into lower rating categories.
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Table 1.2: Recovery Rates and Default Episodes
Date of Time in default Recovery rate
Country default (months) (%)
Russia 09/98 26 45
Pakistan 10/98 14 69
Ecuador 10/99 12 73
Ukraine 01/00 2 72
Argentina 11/01 42 27
Indonesia 04/02 5 na
Paraguay 02/03 14 na
Uruguay 04/03 2 87
Grenada 12/04 10 65
Venezuela 01/05 2 na
Average 13 62
Sources: Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005); Moody’s (2006);
and Standard & Poor’s (2007).
rating aggregates information from two main sources: economic and political risk.
Both factors determine the sovereign’s willingness to repay. The evidence shows that
ratings directly affect the extension to government credit. Table (1.3) displays the
correlation of sovereign ratings and country’s spread over time observed for emerging
economies8. Ratings have been good predictors of defaults. Countries in the lowest
categories account for more than 70 percent of the total number of default episodes
in a one year horizon (See Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s).
8A country’s spread is the difference between a bond of the country and that of similar maturity
in the U.S. For the table, the an index generated by JP Morgan, EMBI, is used to calculate the
correlation with the ratings. Ratings are sovereign ratings reported by Standard & Poor’s and
transformed into numbers using a linear scale.
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Table 1.3: Sovereign Ratings and Spreads
Country Correlation Spreads










Sources: JP Morgan (2007); and Standard & Poor’s (2007).
Figure 1.2: Sovereign Ratings and Interest Rates





















Ratings affect the extension of government credit in four ways. First, a higher
rating implies lower interest rates. Second, the presence of a “selective default” or
“default” flag, constrains a country from market access. Third, after a default,
countries emerge with lower ratings than before the episode. Fourth, countries that
borrow more receive lower ratings. Higher credit ratings translate into lower country
spreads (Cantor and Packer (1996) and Eichengreen and Mody (2000)). For these
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reasons, upgrades or downgrades in sovereign ratings have considerable impact in
countries access to credit. Figure 1.2 shows the relation between rating and spreads
for the group of countries in the previous table during the last decade. Each point
corresponds to a year-country pair. One can observe a clear negative relation.
1.2 Environment
I study sovereign default and debt renegotiation in a dynamic small open economy
with private information. The model consists of a large number of competing lenders
and a sovereign that borrows from them. The country receives a stochastic stream
of income and debt contracts are restricted to one-period bonds. Debt contracts are
not enforceable.
1.2.1 Preferences and Endowment Process





where u(c) is strictly concave and differentiable, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and
ct is aggregate consumption in period t. The endowment of the consumption good
that the agents receive in each period is denoted by yt ∈ Y ⊆ R++. I assume that
yt follows a Markov process with conditional distribution function F (yt+1|yt).
International lenders are risk neutral. They can borrow or lend as much as
necessary at the risk free rate r in international markets.
1.2.2 Government
The government chooses consumption to maximize the expected discounted utility
of the representative consumer. As in Cole, Dow and English (1995) and Phelan
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(2006), I assume that the government transitions between two states. Political
uncertainty, changes in the composition of the leading coalition, or changes in the
distribution of power within the government generate that government’s valuation
of the future varies over time. The political state of the government is private
information and changes over time. According to these states we can classify the
government as “aligned” (the government discounts the future at the same rate as
consumers, i.e. δa = 1) or “misaligned” (the government discounts the future at a
lower rate, i.e. δm < 1). No restrictions are imposed on the value of δm besides
δm ∈ [0, 1). The political state evolves according to a first order markov process
with the transition matrix given by:
Π =





where πi is the probability that at state i the government will stay at the same state
in the following period. The transitions between government states are not observed
by the lenders. For future reference, I will denote the unconditional probability of
a government being an a− type by
π∗ =
(1− πm)
(1− πa) + (1− πm) . (1.3)
1.2.3 Information Structure and Strategies
The credit industry accepts deposits and makes loans to the sovereign country. Asset
markets are not complete. In each period, the government borrows or saves using
only one period non-contingent bonds denoted by b. Let x and x′ be any variable x
at period t and t + 1 respectively. The set of possible values of b is B ≡ [b, b] ⊂ R,
with b < 0 < b. When the government borrows from international markets b′ will
take negative values, b′ < 0.
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The level of debt, output and the actions of the government are observable.
However, the political state is private information and lenders need to infer the
sovereign’s state based on its actions. I will denote by s the lender’s posterior
probability that the government is of the a − type at the given observable state
(b, y). In a markov perfect bayesian equilibrium, the actions of the players will be
specified as function of s.
The government borrows at price q(b′, s′, y) where b′ is the borrowing level,
s′ is the market assessment of the government type, i.e. the probability that the
government is of the a− type and y is the current output realization. If the govern-
ment borrows from foreign lenders, it receives −q(b′, s′, y)b′ units of current period
goods and promises to deliver b′ units of the following period good. The government
is not committed to repay its debts. In equilibrium, the price function will reflect
the risk of default and the recovery value of the defaulted debt. A government that
defaults will remain in financial autarky until it repays an endogenously determined
fraction of the defaulted debt. The variable h will denote the government status in
international credit markets, h ∈ {In,Out}. If h = In, the government does not
have an unresolved default and it is free to borrow or save in credit markets. On
the other hand, if h = Out the government still has to resolve an old default and it
is not allowed to borrow or save.
In the default period, total consumption equals the endowment. If a country
has an unresolved default, h = Out, and unpaid debt b < 0, the country is subject to
exclusion from credit markets and the default situation entitles a proportional output
loss λ ∈ (0, 1). If the government decides to repay, the present value of the debt is
reduced to a fraction φ(b, y, s;σ) of its original size. This fraction is determined at
the renegotiation stage between the government and the lender and depends on the
observable state in the repayment period (b, y, s) and on the probability that the
lenders assign to the government they are facing in the renegotiation stage is of the
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a− type, σ.
The government and the lenders bargain over the debt recovery rate φ(b, y, s; σ).
At the renegotiation stage, a Nash bargaining solution is defined in this environ-
ment with incomplete information. The properties derived from this mechanism are
consistent with what we observe in the data and are explained in more detail in the
next section. After the agreement, the present value of the debt is reduced by a
fraction φ(b, y, s; σ) of its original size b.
1.2.4 Time Line
The timing of events can be summarized as follows: at the beginning of each period,
the government inherited a level of debt b and credit history (s, h). The government’s
type and the country’s endowment are realized. Only the endowment is revealed to
the lenders. When h = In the government decides to default or not. If it decides
not to default, it chooses how much to borrow or lend b′ at price q(b′, s′, y) for the
following period. If it chooses to default, consumption equals the endowment and
h′ = Out. If h = Out the government has an unresolved default and has to decide
to renegotiate or not. If the government repays the reduced debt, φ(b, y, s;σ)b, it
regains access to the credit market in the following period (h′ = In). In the case
the government does not repay the old debt it will stay out of credit markets, h′ =
Out. Based on government actions the lenders will update their information about
the sovereign’s type, i.e. when h = In, s′ is a function of the current observable
government state (b, y, s), the default decision d ∈ {0, 1} and the level of borrowing
b′. When h = Out the posterior s′ is a function of (b, y, s), the repayment decision
z ∈ {0, 1} and the recovery rate φ(b, y, s; σ).
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1.3 Equilibrium
In this paper, I focus on Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, and strategies are
restricted to be stationary functions from beliefs (or more precisely posterior proba-
bilities) to actions. Beliefs and strategies need to be specified for all possible states,
even those that never happen in equilibrium. Markov strategies are defined relative
to the state variable s, the sovereign rating.
Definition 1 A Stationary Markov Strategy for a government in political state
i is a set of stationary functions: consumption, ci(b, y, s, h); debt accumulation,
b′i(b, y, s); default, di(b, y, s) and debt repayment zi(b, y, s).
At observable state (b, y, s, h = In), the probability that lenders assign to a
government of being of the a − type after observing his debt, b′ ∈ B, and default
decisions, d ∈ {0, 1}, is denoted by σIn(b′, d, b, y, s), that is
σIn(b′, d, b, y, s) ≡ Pr(a|b′, d, b, y, s;h = In).
If the government is out of the credit market, i.e. at state (b, y, s, h = Out), the
probability that it is of type a, conditional on the repayment decision z ∈ {0, 1}, is
denoted by σOut(z, b, y, s):
σOut(z, b, y, s) ≡ Pr(a|z, b, y, s; h = Out).
This probabilities are defined for allocations on and off-the equilibrium path. The
possibility of a type change implies that the sovereign rating (the posterior) at the
beginning of the following period is:
ΨIn(b′, d, b, y, s) = πaσIn(b′, d, b, y, s) + (1− πb)(1− σIn(b′, d, b, y, s)), (1.4)
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and
ΨOut(z, b, y, s) = πaσOut(z, b, y, s) + (1− πb)(1− σOut(z, b, y, s)). (1.5)
1.3.1 Government’s Problem
The objective of the government is to maximize the expected discounted utility of
the representative consumer. The government solves the following problem: If it
is active in credit markets and has debt, it chooses to default or not and in the
case of no-default how much to borrow or lend. If it is active but it does not have
debt, it only chooses how much to borrow or save. If it is not active it chooses to
renegotiate or not. The state variables for the government are its political state
i ∈ {a,m}, the level of assets inherited from the previous period b, the endowment
y, the probability the lender assigns to the government of being of the good type
s and credit history h. Let the value function of a government of type i at state
(b, y, s, h) be denoted by Vi(b, y, s, h). V−i(b, y, s, h) denotes the value function of
the political state different than i.
If b < 0 and h = In, the government can choose between repaying its out-
standing debt or defaulting. If the government settles the debt, it chooses its next
period debt level b′ and consumes. If it defaults, it cannot borrow or save and
consumes its endowment. Based on its actions, the sovereign rating is updated to
s′ = ΨIn(b′, d, b, y, s) and h′ is set to In or Out if d = 0 or d = 1 respectively. The
value function is
Vi(b, y, s, In) = max
{
vndi (b, y, s), v
d
i (b, y, s)
}
. (1.6)
vndi (b, y, s) denotes the value of “no-default”:
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πiVi(b′, y′, s′, In) + (1− πi)V−i(b′, y′, s′, In)
]}
,(1.7)
s.t. c + q(b′, s′, y)b′ ≤ y + b,
s′ = ΨIn(b′, d = 0, b, y, s).
vdi (b, y, s) is the value of “default”:
vdi (b, y, s) = u(y) + βδiEy′|y
[
πiVi(b, y′, s′, Out) + (1− πi)V−i(b, y′, s′, Out)
]
, (1.8)
s.t. s′ = ΨIn(b, d = 1, b, y, s).
If b ≥ 0 and h = In, the government does not have debt, so there is no
default decision to make. In this case, the value for a government i− type is given
by
Vi(b, y, s, In) = vndi (b, y, s). (1.9)
If h = Out the country is out of the credit market and has some unpaid
debt b < 0. While the country is in this state, it suffers a proportional output loss
of size λy. Only if the government repays the old debt, reduced to φ(b, y, s;σ)b, it
will regain access to credit markets. The recovery rate φ(b, y, s; σ) is endogenously
determined in the bargaining process and can take any value in [0, 1]. The problem
that the government solves is:
Vi(b, y, s, Out) = max
{
vri (b, y, s), v
nr




vri (a, y, s) denotes the value of “repay”:
vri (b, y, s) = u(y+φ(b, y, s;σ)b)+βδiEy′|y
[
πiVi(0, y′, s′, In)+(1−πi)V−i(0, y′, s′, In)
]
(1.11)
s.t. s′ = Ψh=Out(z = 1, b, y, s).
vnri (b, y, s) denotes the value of “no-repay”:
vnri (b, y, s) = u(y(1− λ)) + βδiEy′|y
[
πiVi(b, y′, s′, Out) + (1− πi)V−i(b, y′, s′, Out)
]
(1.12)
s.t. s′ = Ψh=Out(z = 0, b, y, s).
The solution to this problem provides the value function Vi(a, y, s, h) for
i = a,m and ∀ (b, y, s, h) and the optimal choices, b′ = gi(b, y, s), di(b, y, s), and
zi(b, y, s) of assets, default and repayment respectively. These optimal choices allow
me to characterize the default set Di(b, s) ⊆ Y and the renegotiation set Zi(b, s) ⊆ Y
for a government in political state i as follows:
Di(b, s) = {y ∈ Y : di(b, y, s) = 1}, (1.13)
and
Zi(b, s) = {y ∈ Y : zi(b, y, s) = 1}. (1.14)
For future reference, I can also define the set of endowments for which a government
in political state i with posterior s chooses b′:
Ei(b′, b, s) = {y ∈ Y : di(b, y, s) = 0 & gi(b, y, s) = b′}. (1.15)
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1.3.2 Foreign Lender’s Problem
Foreign creditors can borrow or lend at the risk free-rate r ≥ 0. The market for
sovereign bonds is competitive so they take the price schedule q(b′, s′, y) as given.
Recall from equation (1.4) that after choosing b′ the government is thought to be of
the a−type at the beginning of the following period with probability s′ = ΨIn(b′, d =
0, b, y, s). From the default set defined in (1.13) it is possible to derive the equilibrium
probability of default on a loan b′ when the government is at state (b, y, s):







The default probability takes into account the possible type change at the end of
the period as well as the transition to different endowments levels. With probability
s′ = ΨIn(b′, d = 0, b, y, s) the government is of the a − type in the following period
and will default in endowments states y′ ∈ Da(b′, s′). Similarly, with probability
(1 − s′) = (1 − ΨIn(b′, d = 0, b, y, s)) the government is of the m − type in the
following period and will default in endowments states y′ ∈ Dm(b′, s′).
The profit on a loan of size b′ made to a government with assets b, endow-
ment y and current rating s, denoted by Ω(b′, s′, y; p, ρ), equals the expected present
discounted value of inflows less the current value of outflows. It depends on the price
q(b′, s′, y), on the probability of the government defaulting on it, p(b′, s′, y), and on
the expected present value of loan repayments after a default, ρ(b, s, y). In equilib-
rium, the function ρ(b, s, y) is derived from the decision rules of the government and
the posterior function. Consider a situation where a government with prior s is in
financial autarky. At the beginning of a period, before any action is taken, lenders
expects to receive:
[sza(b, y, s) + (1− s)zm(b, y, s)]φ(b, y, s; σ)(−b),
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that is, with probability s, lenders are facing an a− type government and they will
receive φ(b, y, s; σ)(−b) if the government chooses to repay, i.e. if za(b, y, s) = 1.
Similarly, with probability (1− s) they are facing a m− type government and they
will receive φ(b, y, s;σ)(−b) if the government chooses to repay, i.e. if zm(b, y, s) = 1.
Recursively, the expected recovery value on a defaulted loan is




[s(1− za(b, y, s)) + (1− s)(1− zm(b, y, s))]Ey′|y[ρ(b, s′, y′)],
where the posterior s′ corresponds to a government that chooses not to repay, i.e.
s′ = ΨOut(z = 0, b, y, s). Hence, the profit on a loan of size b′ made to a government
with assets b, endowment y and current rating s, Ω(b′, s′, y; p, ρ) is







where s′′ = ΨIn(b′, d′ = 1, b′, y′, s′) is the posterior for the government after a default.
In most of the recent models of sovereign debt, it is assumed that countries
obtain full discharge of debt after a default (see for example Arellano (2007) and
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)). This implies that, in these papers, the last term in
expression (1.17) always equals zero. The exception is the paper by Yue (2007)
that considers endogenous debt renegotiation in an environment with full informa-
tion. However, in that paper, there is no delay in reaching an agreement and debt
reduction is immediate because countries are forced to renegotiate in the default
period.
Perfect competition implies that Ω(b′, s′, y; p, ρ) = 0 and the equilibrium price
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function is:











This expression shows why the probability of default plays an important role in
determining the equilibrium price. As expected, a higher probability implies a higher
interest rate (a lower price). However, the value of the expected recovery value
ρ(b′, s′′, y′′) sets a limit to the lowest value of the contract. At a given default
probability, higher recovery rates will imply lower interest rates. Since p(b′, s′, y) ∈
[0, 1] and 0 ≤ Ey′|y[ρ(b′, s′′, y′′)/(−b′)] ≤ 1 the set of feasible prices is Q = [0, (1 +
r)−1].
1.3.3 Debt Renegotiation: A Nash Mechanism
In an environment with full information, a “reasonable” outcome is the Nash bar-
gaining solution because it is pairwise Pareto-efficient. In contrast, for meetings with
incomplete information very few guidelines exist for the choice of the mechanism.
Following Berentsen and Rocheteau (2004), I choose a particular mechanism, which
maximizes the product of the expected surplus of the government and the lenders,
given their beliefs, that coincides with the Nash bargaining solution when there is
complete information. This mechanism has many implications consistent with what
we observe in the data. These are explained in more detail in the section with the
estimation results.
Upon the bargaining agreement, the present value of defaulted debt is re-
duced to a fraction ϕ of the unpaid debt b. The value of an agreement of size ϕ to
a government in political state i is
vri (b, y, s;ϕ) = u(y + ϕb) + βδiEy′|y
[




that is the expected life time utility of repayment at state (b, y, s) when the debt
recovery is ϕ. The value of the posterior is s′ = πaσ + (1 − πm)(1 − σ) where σ
denotes the prior probability that lenders’ assign to the government they are facing
at the bargaining stage of being of the a− type.
In order to keep the model tractable, I assume that the threat point of the
government in political state i is permanent autarky with output cost λy. Recur-
sively, the autarky value vauti (y) for government of type i at income level y is





′) + (1− πi)vaut−i (y′)
]
.
Thus, for a government of the i− type, the surplus of an agreement is
∆Bi (ϕ; b, y, s) = v
r
i (b, y, s; ϕ)− vauti (y). (1.18)
The surplus of the agreement for the lenders is the present value of the recovered
debt:
∆L(ϕ; b, y, s) = −ϕb. (1.19)
If lenders have all the bargaining power, then they could extract all the government’s
surplus and viceversa. To analyze a general case, I assume that the government has
bargaining power θ and the lender has bargaining power (1 − θ). The bargaining
power is independent of σ and thus is not affected by the timing of the repayment
decision. The optimal debt recovery rate φ(b, y, s;σ) satisfies the following program:
φ(b, y, s; σ) ≡ arg max
ϕ∈[0,1]
[σ∆Ba (ϕ; b, y, s) + (1− σ)∆Bb (ϕ; b, y, s)]θ[∆L(ϕ; b, y, s)]1−θ
(1.20)
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s.t. ∆Ba (ϕ; b, y, s) ≥ 0,
∆Bm(ϕ; b, y, s) ≥ 0,
∆L(ϕ; b, y, s) ≥ 0.
Under this mechanism, the resulting offer maximizes the product of the expected
surpluses of the players given their prior beliefs subject to the corresponding partic-
ipation constraints of the government of type a, the government of type m and the
lenders. The solution to this mechanism is a single offer. Hence, by construction,
the value of ϕ that maximizes (1.20) is also incentive compatible.
Note that, in equilibrium, agreements are reached in one period. However,
the period of financial exclusion is still endogenous in this model. At a given re-
covery schedule φ(b, y, s; σ), the government will optimally choose when to start the
renegotiation process. The expected duration of financial exclusion increases with
the equilibrium repayment fraction.
1.3.4 Definition of Equilibrium
A Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (MPBE) requires that, at every possible
state (including those that only occur in off-the-equilibrium-path), agents’ beliefs
over the types and strategies of the other agents must be specified. Given these
beliefs, each agent must choose actions that are the best responses to the strategies
of the other agents. The government and the lenders only use stationary Markov
strategies.
Definition 2 A MPBE is a set of functions V ∗i , σ
∗, q∗, p∗, ρ∗, φ∗ and sets D∗i , E
∗
i
and Z∗i such that:
1. Given posterior functions, prices and the recovery rate, the value functions V ∗i




i for i = a,m, are consistent with the government’s
optimization problem.
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2. Given posterior functions, prices and value functions V ∗i for i = a,m, the
recovery rate φ(b, y, s; σ∗) is derived from the bargaining mechanism.
3. The equilibrium default probability p∗(b′, s′, y) and expected recovery ρ∗(b′, s′, y)
are consistent with the government decision rules and the bargaining solution.
4. The equilibrium price is such that foreign creditors earn zero profits in expected
value, that is at q∗(b′, s′, y)
Ω∗(b′, s′, y; p∗, ρ∗) = 0, for all (b′, s′, y),
5. The function σ∗ must be consistent with Bayes’ rule (whenever possible) and
posteriors are defined as in equations (1.4) and (1.5).
The definition of equilibrium is standard. Condition 5 defines the function σ∗
and it deserves a detailed explanation. This function must be consistent with Bayes’
rule whenever applicable. When h = In, the probability that a government is type
a conditional on their asset market behavior was denoted by σh=In(b′, d, b, y, s), and
can be written as
σIn(b′, d, b, y, s) =
Pr(b′, d, b, y, s|a) Pr(a)
Pr(b′, d, b, y, s)
=
Pr(b′, d|a, b, y, s) Pr(a|b, y, s)∑





′, d|i, b, y, s) Pr(i|b, y, s) > 0. When the conditioning set is empty,
the definition of equilibrium does not impose any restriction. In the computation and
estimation of the model, I set the off-the-equilibrium path posteriors σ as follows: if
the government defaults is believed to be of the misaligned type; if the government
does not default and increases or maintains the level of debt is also believed to be
of the misaligned type; if the government does not default and decreases the level of
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debt is believed to be of the aligned type; if repays it is believed to be of the aligned
type.9
Prior to the government’s type realization, the posterior probability that a
government with observable state (b, y, s, h = In) who also defaults on his loan, is
of type a is given by




1 if y ∈ Da(b, s) and y /∈ Dm(b, s),
0 if y /∈ Da(b, s) and y ∈ Dm(b, s),
s if y ∈ Da(b, s) and y ∈ Dm(b, s).
The posterior function σh=In(b, d = 1, b, y, s) is defined off-the-equilibrium path
when y /∈ Da(b, s) and y /∈ Dm(b, s) because Bayes’ rule is not applicable. One of
the main differences between the environment in this paper and that in Chatterjee
et. al. (2007) is that income is observable. This translates into a simpler posterior
function, i.e. at a given state (b, y, s), σh(·) can take only three values: 1, 0 or s.10
The probability that a government with observable state (b, y, s, h = In) who
does not default on his loan and chooses b′ is of type a is given by




1 if y ∈ Ea(b′, b, s) and y /∈ Em(b′, b, s),
0 if y /∈ Ea(b′, b, s) and y ∈ Em(b′, b, s),
s if y ∈ Ea(b′, b, s) and y ∈ Em(b′, b, s)
9The estimation results that I present later are robust to different assumptions about the off-
the-equilibrium path beliefs.
10Multiple computations show that existence of an equilibrium is still an issue but the space of
parameters for which an equilibrium does not exists is considerably reduced.
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Similarly, when h = Out, after observing the decision to repay or not, the probability
that the government is of the a− type is:
σOut(z, b, y, s) =
Pr(z, b, y, s|a) Pr(a)
Pr(z, b, y, s)
=
Pr(z|a, b, y, s) Pr(a|b, y, s)∑




i Pr(z|i, b, y, s) Pr(i|b, y, s) > 0. Hence, at h = Out, when the govern-
ment repays the probability that it is of the a− type is:




1 if y ∈ Z∗a(b, s) and y /∈ Z∗m(b, s),
0 if y /∈ Z∗a(b, s) and y ∈ Z∗m(b, s),
s if y ∈ Z∗a(b, s) and y ∈ Z∗m(b, s).
and when it does not repay




1 if y /∈ Z∗a(b, s) and y ∈ Z∗m(b, s),
0 if y ∈ Z∗a(b, s) and y /∈ Z∗m(b, s),
s if y /∈ Z∗a(b, s) and y /∈ Z∗m(b, s).
Once σIn(b′, d, b, y, s) and σOut(φ, z, b, y, s) have been defined for each pos-
sible history and state, the new posterior, s′, can be obtained from equations (1.4)
and (1.5).
1.4 Computation and Estimation
The model is solved numerically. In this section, I describe the computation and
estimation procedures. No restrictions are imposed on parameter values or equilib-
rium behavior. Off the equilibrium beliefs were defined in the previous section.
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1.4.1 Model Specification




where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The endowment is modeled as a
first order autoregressive process:
ln(yt) = ρy ln(yt−1) + ηt, with η ∼ N(0, ση).
The full set of 10 parameters in the benchmark model is:
{r, β, γ, δm, πa, πm, λ, ρy, ση, θ},
where r is the risk free rate; β is the discount factor of the representative consumer;
γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion; δm is parameter affecting the discount
factor of the m− type government; πa and πm are the transition probabilities; λ is
the output cost during financial autarky; ρy and ση control the endowment process;
and θ is the bargaining power of the government (probability that it makes the offer
at the bargaining stage).
1.4.2 Parameter Values and Estimation
I classify the parameters into two groups. The first group consists of 6 parameters,
{r, β, γ, ρy, ση, λ}, each of which can be pinned down independently of all other
parameters by one target. The risk free rate r is set to 1.5% to match the average
quarterly real return on 5 year U.S. T-bills in the last 35 years. The parameter γ
is set equal to 2, a common value in the open economy literature. The discount
factor β = (1 + r)−1. The endowment process is estimated using data from the
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Ministry of Finance of Argentina from 1980Q1 to 2006Q4 which are log seasonally
adjusted real GDP. The data is detrended using the HP-filter with parameter 1600.
The estimated values are ρy = 0.86 and ση = 0.024. The estimated values are used
to derive a finite First Order Markov process by the Tauchen-Hussey method. The
number of grid points for the endowment is set equal to 21. The additional loss of
output in autarky, λ is set at 2% consistent with the finding of Sturzenegger (2002)
that estimates the percentage of output contraction after default using a panel of
100 countries.11 This value of output loss during period of exclusion is also used in
the papers of Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Yue (2007).
A second group, {δm, πa, πm, θ} is jointly estimated to match target statis-
tics of the Argentinean economy and recent default episodes. This is done by the
Simulated Method of Moments. This procedure consists of minimizing the distance
between data moments and moments extracted from the simulated model. That is,
the parameters are chosen to minimize
L(Θ) = [Md −M s(Θ)]W ∗[Md −M s(Θ)]′
with respect to parameters Θ, where Md are the moments from the data, M s(Θ)
are the moments from the simulated model at parameters Θ. W ∗ is positive defi-
nite and optimally derived weighting matrix. Given the potential for discontinuities
in the model and the discretization of the state space, I used a simulated anneal-
ing algorithm to perform the optimization. Standard errors are computed from
the derivative of the objective function with respect to the structural parameters
evaluated at the point estimates. 12
The moments used in the estimation are the default frequency, the standard
11In a previous version of the paper, I estimated this parameter and the point estimate was close
to 2%.
12See Gourieroux and Monfort (1996) and Ingram and Lee (1991).
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deviation of the current account to output ratio, the average period in the state
of default and the ratio of the standard deviation of consumption to the standard
deviation of output. Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) report four episodes
of sovereign defaults in Argentina’s external debt from 1824 to 1999. In 2001,
Argentina defaulted a fifth time on its external debts, making its average default
frequency 2.78% or 0.68% quarterly. This value is similar to the average for emerging
economies reported in Table 1.1. The current account to output ratio is computed for
the period 1980q1 to 2006q4. The standard deviation is equal to 1.38%. The average
period in the state of default is computed using data from Standard and Poor’s
(2007). This value is found to be equal to 4.33 quarters and it is also consistent with
the estimates of Gelos et al. (2002), who use a large sample of emerging economies
to find that during default episodes in the 1990’s, economies were excluded from
the credit markets for about a year. Many have documented that consumption is
more volatile than output in emerging economies (see for example Neuymeyer and
Perri (2005)). The relative volatility of consumption σ(c)/σ(y) in Argentina for the
period 1980Q1-2006Q4 is equal to 1.12.
These moments were chosen mainly for two reasons. First, it is important
that the moments are informative. For instance if one of the moments is independent
of the parameterization of the model, we are left to estimate an under-identified
model. The size of the standard errors show that the model is identified. Second,
and in order to make a fair comparison of the results in this paper to those in
previous papers in sovereign debt literature the moments chosen are similar to the




Computation of the equilibrium requires three steps: an inner loop, where the deci-
sion problem of the government given parameter values, prices, the recovery sched-
ule and posteriors is solved; a middle loop, where prices, the recovery schedule and
posteriors are obtained; and an outside loop or estimation loop where parameter
values that yield equilibrium allocations with the desired (target) properties are
determined. To solve the model I use the discrete state space method. Posterior
functions need to be defined for every element of the debt state space. The computa-
tional task is extremely burdensome, each equilibrium requires computing thousands
of equilibrium loan prices and posteriors. Moreover, the existence of an equilibrium
is not always guaranteed and this makes the estimation even more difficult.
To resemble what we observe in international credit markets, sovereign rat-
ings are restricted to take a finite number of values, i.e. s ∈ S ≡ {s1, s2, . . . , sN}.
Recall that the future score was specified in equations (1.4) and (1.5) and given by
functions s′ = ΨIn(b′, d, b, y, s) and s′ = ΨOut(z, b, y, s). The technological assump-
tion I make here is that the beginning of next period sovereign rating is
Ψ̂In(b′, d, b, y, s) = arg min
si∈S
|ΨIn(b′, d, b, y, s)− si|, when h = In,
and
Ψ̂Out(z, b, y, s) = arg min
si∈S
|ΨOut(z, b, y, s)− si|, when h = Out.
In words, this is just saying that future scores are assigned to the grid point that is
closest in absolute value. Given this technological assumption, in the computation
of the model, Ψ̂h is substituted everywhere I have Ψh. The value of N is set to 20
as in the available scales for sovereign ratings by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s.
Note that s1 = (1 − πm) and sN = πa. Moreover, the Markov process for political
states implies that the average value of s in the long-run is equal to π∗.
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1.4.4 Estimated Parameters and Model Moments
Table 1.4 displays the parameters values that can be pinned down independently
of all other parameters by one target. The estimated parameters as well as their
standard errors and the model moments are reported in Table 1.5. The optimal
weighting matrix in the SMM procedure is derived from the variance-covariance
matrix of the moments.
Table 1.4: Model Parameters: Independent Targets
Parameter Value Moment
Risk free interest rate r 0.015 Q. real return US T-bill
Discount Factor β 0.9852 (1 + r)−1
Risk aversion γ 2
Autocorrelation Endowment ρ 0.86 Argentina Output 1980-2006
Std. Dev. Error ση 0.024 Argentina Output 1980-2006
Output Loss λ 0.02 Observed output loss
The discount factor of the misaligned government is found to be only 18%
lower than that of the aligned government. The degree of impatience reflects some
political instability in Argentina during this period. The values of πa and πm imply
that in the stationary equilibrium a government will be of the aligned type approx-
imately 80% of the time. Finally, the bargaining power, θ, is estimated to be 0.57
which shows that Argentina has a more favorable position in debt renegotiation than
international investors.
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Table 1.5: Estimated Parameters and Moments
Parameter Value Std. Error
Discount Factor m− type δm 0.818 0.012
Probability a− type πa 0.941 0.009
Probability m− type πm 0.759 0.032
Bargaining Power θ 0.574 8.23e− 04
Moment Data (%) Model (%)
Default Probability 0.68 0.64
Std. Dev. Current Account/Output 1.38 1.45
Average exclusion period (quarters) 4.33 4.09
Relative volatility of consumption σ(c)/σ(y) 1.12 1.08
The model is able to generate the default frequency observed in the data, as
well as the standard deviation of the current account to output ratio. In equilibrium,
the length of the period of exclusion and the relative volatility of consumption to
output are consistent with what we observe in emerging economies. In the following
section, I discuss what these parameters imply for the relation between the type
probabilities and the government behavior. In particular, I show that we can identify
this probabilities with the sovereign rates that agencies specialized in sovereign debt
construct. After that, I show what are the implications of combining government
reputation and endogenous recovery rates and periods of exclusion for the debt to
output ratio.
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1.5 Type Probabilities as Sovereign Ratings
Sovereign ratings are a key determinant of the interest rate a country faces. In the
introduction, I described the relevance of sovereign ratings in international markets
and in particular how they affect the loan prices for emerging economies. In sum-
mary, ratings affect the extension of government credit in four ways. First, a higher
rating implies lower interest rates. Second, the presence of a “selective default”
or “default” flag, constrains a country from market access. Third, after resolving
a default, ratings are upgraded. Fourth, countries that borrow more receive lower
ratings. In this section, I show that the type probabilities generated by the model
are consistent with the sovereign ratings observed in the data because: (i) the type
probability s drops after a default; (ii) The government increases its reputation af-
ter renegotiating and repaying and old debt; (iii) if the government takes on more
debt s decreases. Hence, from the perspective of lenders, the type probability s (the
probability that the government is of the a− type) can be identified with a sovereign
rating.
The interaction between default, borrowing and repayment is crucial to de-
termine the relation between the type probabilities and the sovereign ratings. For
example, when the government decides to default, how much debt the government
takes and when it decides to borrow affect its reputation. In Figure 1.3, I plot
the default, borrowing and repayment decision rules for both government types at
average debt, as a function of income and evaluated at average s, that is s = π∗.
34
Figure 1.3: Government Decision Rules





































Panel (a) of Figure 1.3 shows that incentives to default are stronger in “bad
times” and that the default probability is higher for a misaligned government. At
low levels of income both government types decide to default when b = −0.40. The
a−type government defaults for y < 0.97. The m−type decision rule shows a similar
dependence on income levels but this government type default in more states. In
particular, for y < 1.04 the misaligned government chooses to default. For income
y ∈ [0.977, 1.038] the a− type government is able to perfectly signal its type by not
defaulting. For higher levels of income the debt decision is crucial in determining
the government reputation.
Panel (b) of Figure 1.3 shows the borrowing decision rule for the a − type
and the m − type government. Recall that the government is able to borrow or
save only in periods that it chooses not to default. We observe that ba(b, y, s) ≤
bm(b, y, s) for all (y) at s = π∗ and this will have also important implications for
sovereign ratings. In particular, increasing the level of indebtedness have negative
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implications on sovereign ratings (see Figure 1.5 below). For y ∈ [1.047, 1.07] the
m−type government mimics the behavior of the a−type government to maintain its
reputation. At y = 1.1 the a−type government signals its type by borrowing a lower
amount than the m− type government. The m− type government prefers to face a
higher interest rate and a lower reputation than follow the a = type government at
this income level.
Panel (c) of Figure 1.3 displays the repayment decision rules for the a− type
and the m−type government over income. At this debt level, the a−type government
chooses to repay for every level of income. By repaying when output is low the
a− type government is able to perfectly signal its type. The m− type government
repays only for y > 1.04. The repayment decision dependents on the level of income
and, as it will be also evident in Figure 1.6 below, incentives to repay are stronger
in good times. This is consistent with the data presented in Kovrijnykh and Szentes
(2007) on the timing of debt repayment.
What are the main implications of the government behavior on its reputation
and the posterior functions (rating functions)? I will start by describing the function
σIn(b′, d, b, y, s) in the case of a default, i.e. when d = 1. It is important to start
with this function because what a government reveals by its default decision will
be one of the key determinants of the interest rate it faces. Figure 1.4 displays
the posterior function σIn(b, d = 1, b, y, s) as a function of the sovereign rating for
different bond levels and evaluated at different income levels. From this figure we
note that σIn(b, d = 1, b, y, s) ≤ s for all (b, y, s). Thus, a government contemplating
to default recognizes that this will lower its rating and presumably raise its future
interest rates.
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Figure 1.4: A Default Lowers the Sovereign Rating






















































Panels (a), (b) and (c) of Figure 1.4 show the function σIn after a default
for high, average and low debt levels respectively and evaluated at different income
realizations. In Panel (a) of Figure 1.4, we observe that for debt levels b = −0.60, a
debt level 50% higher than average debt, because both type of governments choose
to default when income is equal to 0.91 or 1 (lower or equal to average income),
the posterior probability that the government is of the a− type equals the prior s.
When income is higher than its average, y = 1.1, only the misaligned government
defaults and the rating drops to its lowest value after breaking the debt contract.
In particular, σIn(b, d = 1, b, 1.1, s) = 0 for all s. The decision of no-default allows
the aligned government to perfectly signal its type and increase its reputation.
Panel (b) of Figure 1.4 shows the posterior probability σIn for a government
that defaults at average debt b = −0.40 . When income is at its lowest possible value
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y = 0.91 both government types choose to default and σIn(b, d = 1, b, y, s) = s. As
income rises, reputation provides the incentives for the aligned type government to
choose not to default. The a − type government chooses not to default for any s
and the m − type government chooses to default for all s. In this case σIn(b, d =
1, b, y, s) = 0 and the government that defaults is believed to be of the m − type.
When y = 1.1, none of the government types choose to default, so posteriors are
defined off-the-equilibrium path and set equal to 0, i.e. σIn(b, d = 1, b, y, s) =
0. Finally, Panel (c) of Figure 1.4 shows the posterior probability σIn at b =
−0.20 (50% of average debt). When income is low, y = 0.91, only the m − type
government defaults and σIn(b, d = 1, b, y, s) = 0. For higher income levels none of
the government types choose to default and σIn(b, d = 1, b, y, s) = 0 as defined by
the off-the-equilibrium assumption on posteriors.
Evidence on emerging economies shows that the borrowing decision also af-
fects the value of the future rating. In particular, taking on more debt negatively
impacts the sovereign rating. Figure 1.5 shows that the model is also consistent
with this fact. Panel (a) shows how the posterior function responds to the same
level of borrowing but at different income levels. When income is y = 0.98 (be-
low average) only the m− type government chooses b′ = −0.39 and σIn(−0.39, d =
0, b = −0.4, y = 1, s) = 1 for all s. When income equals 1.04, both government types
choose the same level of borrowing and σIn(−0.39, d = 0, b = −0.40, y = 1, s) = s
for all s. When income is y = 1.1 (10% above average) both government types
choose the same level of borrowing. In this case, only the m − type government
chooses b′ = −0.39 and σIn(−0.39, d = 0, b = −0.4, y = 1, s) = 0 for all s.
In Panel (b) of Figure 1.5 we observe how the posterior is affected by different
borrowing levels. When b′ = −0.39, the posterior takes value σIn(−0.39, d = 0, b =
−0.40, y = 1, s) = 0 because only the m− type chooses this action. This government
obtains a higher consumption level today at the cost of loosing its reputation. If
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b′ = −0.38, σIn(−0.34, d = 0, b = −0.35, y = 1, s) = 1 and the a− type government
perfectly signals its type. In this case, a lower amount of debt allows the government
to build a reputation. In the data, I observe that ratings are negatively correlated
with the level of borrowing.
Figure 1.5: Increasing Indebtedness Lowers the Sovereign Rating









































Data on sovereign ratings also show that countries increase their ratings after
repayment. Also, if a government chooses not to repay, the rating is kept as its lower
level. From Figure 1.6 we can infer that this is also an equilibrium outcome. In par-
ticular, Zm(b, s) ⊆ Za(b, s), i.e. the a−type government is prone to repay more often
than the m − type. Figure 1.6 displays the posterior function σOut(z = 1, b, y, s),
for a government that chooses to renegotiate and repay a previously defaulted debt.
As it is clear from Panels (a), (b) and (c) σOut(z = 1, b, y, s) ≥ s for all (b, y, s) and
in most cases, an align government will signal its type by resolving an old default.
Panel (a) of Figure 1.6 shows that when the debt level is 50% higher than
average debt, b = −0.60, only the aligned type government chooses to repay. In this
39
case the repayment decision signals the government type perfectly and σOut(z =
1,−0.60, y, s) = 1 for all s. From Panel (b) of Figure 1.6 we observe that, when
debt is equal to average debt, b = −0.40, the government behaves similarly and the
posterior σOut(z = 1,−0.40, y, s) = 1. Panel (c) shows that when b = −0.20 (50% of
average debt) only the aligned government renegotiates and repays when y = 0.91
for all s implying that σOut(z = 1,−0.20, y = 0.91, s) = 1. For other combinations
of income and ratings, both government types choose to renegotiate and repay and
hence σOut(z = 1,−0.20, y, s) = s. In this case, by choosing to repay, the m− type
government is able to maintain its reputation.
Figure 1.6: The Sovereign Rating Increases with Repayment



















































Next, I plot the equilibrium bond price as a function of current rating. Recall
that in equilibrium the current debt level and sovereign rating affect loan prices
through the posterior function, i.e. q(b′, s′ = ΨIn(b′, d = 0, b, y, s), y). Panel (a) of
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Figure 1.7 shows the bond price as a function of the sovereign rating s for different
borrowing levels, b′, evaluated at mean income and when current debt equals mean
debt (b = −0.40). Panel (b) of Figure 1.7 shows how different bond prices over
sovereign ratings translate into sovereign spreads Rs ≡ 1/q− (1 + r), defined as the
difference between the country interest rate and the risk free rate.
Figure 1.7: Negative Relation between Sovereign Ratings and Loan Prices






































The model generates a relation between sovereign ratings and spreads that
is consistent with the data. Higher ratings imply lower spreads and viceversa. This
relation between sovereign ratings and bond prices is important in creating the
incentives to sustain higher debt levels in equilibrium because a− type governments
are able to obtain a lower interest rate by signaling its type. Moreover, an m− type
government that mimics the a− type government and increases its sovereign rating
also faces a lower interest rate. Another important property of the equilibrium is
41
that at a given s, if default is optimal for a government of type i at b1 with b1 > b0,
then default is also optimal for b0. That is, Di(b1, s) ⊆ Di(b0, s). This implies that
p(b0, s, y) ≥ p(b1, s, y) and q(b0, s, y) ≤ q(b1, s, y).
For completeness, in Figure 1.8, I show the price schedule as a function of
future debt levels when b = −0.40 for different income levels and sovereign ratings.
Panel (a), (b) and (c) correspond to low (y = 0.91), average (y = 1) and high income
(y = 1.1) respectively.
Figure 1.8: Price Function for different income and rating levels






















































Higher ratings have value because they affect the price at which the gov-
ernments borrow. Within each panel, the price function is plotted for s ∈ {1 −
πm, π
∗, πa} that correspond to the lowest, the average and the highest sovereign rat-
ing. The relation between sovereign ratings and interest rates is also evident from
this picture. A higher rating implies a lower interest (whenever the interest rate is
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not equal to (1 + r)−1). From this figure we can see that as income increases the
price for new loans also increases (interest rates decrease).
Default episodes observed during the last decade were associated with severe
economic crisis. Figure 1.9 shows that in the model, default incentives are stronger
during low income realizations. This figure displays the default probability over in-
come levels for different combinations of debt, evaluated at average score, π∗. When
debt is b = −0.60, the probability of default is equal to one for all income levels. At
the average debt level b = −0.40 the default probability is strictly decreasing in y
for y ≤ 1 = E[y]. After that, the probability of default is equal to zero.
Figure 1.9: Default Incentives and Income

















The introduction of endogenous recovery has important implications for re-
solving the sovereign debt puzzle. The country incentive to default depends on
the renegotiation agreement on debt reduction. As in Yue (2007), it can be shown
that for a given bargaining power θ, there exists a threshold b̄(y, s) such that the
equilibrium recovery function φ satisfies





b if b ≤ b̄(y, s),
1 if b > b̄(y, s).
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Figure 1.10: Recovery Schedule
































Hence, debt recovery rates decrease with the amount of defaulted debt, and
there is no debt reduction for debt levels smaller than the threshold. Observations
from recent sovereign defaults are consistent with the equilibrium recovery schedule.
Panel (a) of Figure 1.10 shows the equilibrium recovery schedule as a function of
debt and income evaluated at π∗. The resulting recovery rate is increasing in the
level of income. A novelty of this model is the relation between recovery rates and
the sovereign rating. Panel (b) of Figure 1.10 displays the recovery rate evaluated
at average income for different values of s. We can note that the recovery rate is
increasing in s. In summary, the bargaining mechanism generates that repayment
incentives are stronger in good times, debt reduction is lower as debt levels decrease
and that countries that defaulted on a bigger debt stay longer in financial autarky.
The average recovery rate is equal to 59%. The average recovery rate for emerging
economies computed from Chuhan and Sturzenegger (2005) and Moody’s (2006)
report on recovery rates for defaults in the last decade is found to be 62.5%.
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Figure 1.11: Evolution of Debt and Ratings

















Panel (a): Evolution of Debt


























To conclude this section, in Figure 1.11, I show the evolution of debt and
ratings in a simulation of 100 periods with no defaults. In Panel (a), circles corre-
spond to the borrowing decision b′a(b, y, s) of the a− type government. In Panel (b),
circles correspond to the sovereign rating obtained by an a− type government after
the borrowing decision s′ = ΨIn(b′, d = 0, b, y, s). Similarly, in Panels (a) and (b),
squares correspond to debt levels b′m(b, y, s) chosen by an m− type government and
ratings s′ = ΨIn(b′, d = 0, b, y, s) obtained by an m− type government respectively.
From Panel (a), we observe that the m− type government generally borrows more
than the a − type government. Panel (b) show how fast lenders learn about the
government type. The process for types implies that the score will tend to return
to the mean π∗ if no information can be extracted from the government actions, i.e.
σIn(b′, d = 0, b, y, s) = s. Cycles of signaling and confusion alternate over time.
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1.6 The Debt to Output Puzzle
Recent models of sovereign debt explained how the risk of default interacts with
business cycles in emerging economies (see Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano
(2007) and Yue(2007) for example). However, at the observed default frequency, the
level of debt to output ratio generated by these models was much lower than what
we observe in the data. In particular, the debt to output ( by ) ratio
13 was found to
be 18% in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), 7.33% in Arellano (2007) and 9.69% in Yue
(2007).
Table 1.6: Main Result
Aguiar and
Model Gopinath Arellano Yue
Debt to Output Ratio 39.6 % 18.0 % 7.3 % 9.7 %
% of data 45 % 20 % 8 % 11 %
The debt to output ratio computed at the estimated equilibrium is 39.6%,
that is the model generates more than five times the debt to output ratio generated
by Arellano (2007), more than three times of the value found by Yue (2007) and more
than twice the ratio obtained by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). Note that the debt
to output ratio was not part of the set of moments used in the estimation. When
computed from the the Global Development Finance II data set (compiled by the
World Bank) the average ratio of Government Debt to annual GNP in Argentina
since 1970 is 88%. The aim of this paper was to close the gap between the data and
13These models were also quarterly models and were calibrated to the Argentinean economy.
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the existing literature by introducing political uncertainty in a standard small open
economy model. Effectively, when computed as a fraction of annual output, the the
debt to output ratio in the model is close to 45% of that in the data.
The information structure and the endogenous determination of default penal-
ties (recovery rates and periods of exclusion) are the keys to understanding the in-
tuition behind the main result. In the next section, I will show how the decisions of
the government affect its reputation in credit markets and hence the price of new
loans. In summary, a patient government may be able to get lower interest rates
by choosing not to default and signal its type during bad times of the economy.
Similarly, if the government has an unresolved default the aligned type is willing
to repay sooner than the misaligned type to go back to financial markets with a
higher reputation. Moreover, at some rating levels, a less patient government can
mimic the behavior of the patient government and borrow at low interest rates. All
these factors combine to generate the necessary incentives to make borrowing more
attractive than defaulting. Furthermore, the introduction of endogenous recovery
rates and periods of exclusion makes transiting through a default state much more
costly for any government type and it has two effects over loan prices. First, at a
given debt level, interest rates decrease because default probabilities are lower than
in a world with costless return to markets. Second, the introduction of endogenous
recovery rates makes borrowing more appealing because governments are able to
obtain contingent repayments after a default.
The estimated parameters are in line with those used in previous studies of
sovereign debt. In this paper, the aligned government discounts the future at a rate
equal to 0.985 and the misaligned government discounts the future at a rate equal
to 0.805 (= .818β). The discount factors used in the studies of Arellano (2007),
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Yue (2007) are 0.953, 0.80 and 0.74 respectively.
Arellano (2007) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) do not consider the possibility of
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renegotiation and periods of exclusion are exogenous. The calibrated probability of
returning to capital markets after a default implies that countries spend approxi-
mately 3.84 quarters in autarky for the case of Arellano (2007) and 2.5 years in the
case of Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). Yue (2007) considers debt renegotiation and
also finds that Argentina has a higher market power (equal to 0.83) than lenders at
the renegotiation stage. However, that model implies that countries stay in finan-
cial autarky on average only one quarter, a period much shorter than that observed
for emerging economies. The estimation of the benchmark model developed in this
paper implies that the country stays in financial autarky for about 4 quarters and
the bargaining power of Argentina is 0.574.
In Section 1.7, I show that the combination of private information and en-
dogenous recovery rates are essential ingredients to sustain the observed debt to
output ratios. A model with full information and zero recovery rates generates an
equilibrium debt to quarterly output ratio that is only 13%. In addition, a model
with full information and endogenous recovery generates a debt to quarterly output
ratio that is still only 28%.
1.7 Private Information is Important
To be able to disentangle the effects of private information and endogenous recovery
rates, in this section, I explore how the main results would change if two extensions
of the benchmark model were considered. Both extensions share the characteristic
that government types are public information. That is, in this environment, foreign
lenders are able to observe the government type and the type changes over time. The
first case corresponds to a model were recovery rates are zero and return to markets
is exogenously given (as in Arellano (2007) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)). After
a default countries are able to borrow again in the following period with probability
α and with probability (1 − α) they stay one more period in financial autarky. In
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the second case, I consider a model also with full information but with endogenous
recovery rates (as in Yue (2007)). In both cases I estimate the parameters of the
models to match the moments used in the benchmark case. The equilibrium price
function and the renegotiated repayment fraction will depend on the government
type and not in the sovereign rating. In fact, the sovereign rating does not have any
meaning in a context with full information.
1.7.1 Full Information Models: Estimation and Results
The risk free rate, the parameters of the endowment process and the output cost are
set to the same values of the benchmark model. The parameters left are estimated
through Simulated Method of Moments as described before. The set of moments
used are also the same used for the estimation of benchmark model and depicted
in Table 1.5. For the case of zero recovery rates the set of parameters to define are
{δm, πa, πm, α}. The value of α is chosen in order to obtain an average period of
financial exclusion consistent with the data. For the case of endogenous recovery
rates the set of parameters to define are {δm, πa, πm, θ}. These parameters are
estimated by matching the default probability, the standard deviation of the current
account to output ratio, the mean recovery rate and the average period of financial
exclusion.
The discount factor of the misaligned government is found to be similar in
the three models. The model with full information and endogenous recovery rates
predicts that the country will have an aligned government around 80%. For the
case of the model with zero recovery rates this value is approximately 74%. The
bargaining power of the government do not present major differences across the
models either.
Table 1.7 displays the parameters values and the moments generated by the
models.
49
Table 1.7: Effects of Private Information and Recovery Rates
Full Info Full Info
Benchmark Zero Recovery Endog. Recovery
Parameters
δm 0.818 0.856 0.827
πa 0.941 0.880 0.914
πm 0.759 0.782 0.782
θ 0.574 − 0.605
α − 0.231 −
Moments
Default probability 0.65 0.51 0.59
Std Dev CA/Y 1.46 1.25 1.52
Average exclusion period 4.07 4.33 2.3
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.16 1.02 1.13
Debt to Output ratio 39.5 13.4 28.4
As it is clear from the last row of Table 1.7, the debt to output ratios that
models with full information predict are much lower than in the model with private
information. The model with zero recovery rates generates a debt to output ratio
that is one third of that in the benchmark model. Including endogenous recovery
rates and periods of exclusion generates a higher debt to output ratio but still only
72% of the equilibrium ratio in the presence of private information.
When the political states are observable, reputation has no value. The main
motivation for the borrowing and default decisions is consumption smoothing. In
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that case, the misaligned government will tend to default more often and because
government types are known it will be charged a much higher interest rate than the
aligned government. Moreover, for the aligned government it is not necessary to
change its behavior in order to signal its type. This lowers the benefits from not
defaulting in bad times. The effects of private information and recovery rates can be
seen clearer in Figures 1.12 and 1.13. In these Figures, I plot the price function in a
model with full information and no recovery rates qFINR(b′, i, y), the price function
for the model with full information and endogenous recovery rates and periods of
exclusion, qFINR(b′, i, y), and the price function for the benchmark model q(b′, s′, y).
In a model with no recovery rates there is a strong relation between the default
probability and the price of the bonds. The introduction of recovery rates reduces
the losses associated with a default and lowers interest rates. The introduction
of private information makes incentives not to default stronger shifting the price
schedule to towards higher levels of debt.
Figure 1.12: Price Functions for different models





























Figure 1.13: Price Functions for different models




























1.8 Comparison to the Data: Business Cycle moments
The business cycle moments for emerging economies are well documented and the
results obtained in this paper are consistent with previous studies.14
Using data from Argentina, I found that consumption and output are highly
correlated (corr(y, c) = 0.97) and the correlation between the current account to
output ratio, ca/y and output is −0.82. The data on output, consumption and
current account is taken from the Ministry of Economics in Argentina for the pe-
riod 1980q1 to 2006q4. Variables are real and seasonally adjusted. Output and
consumption are detrended using the HP filter with parameter 1600. The data on
spreads is computed from J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI+)
for Argentina from 1993 to 2001. The sovereign spread is the difference between
the Argentinean interest rate and the real return on a U.S. Treasury bill of similar
14See Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
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maturity. The standard deviation of spreads is 3.07% and the average spread is
7.75%. If the statistics on spreads are derived from 3-year foreign currency denomi-
nated bonds from 1993 to 2001 taken from Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2004)
the value of the standard deviation is 1.69% and the average spread is 4.08%. The
rating data is computed using the Standard & Poor’s rating for Argentina since its
first date available, 1993q3, to 2006q4. The correlation of ratings and output is 47%
and the correlation with spreads is -81%.
Table 1.8 displays the moments from the data and those from the simulated
model. The model generates business cycle statistics that are in line with the data.
In particular, consumption is highly correlated with output and the current account
is countercyclical.
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Table 1.8: Non-Target Moments
Aguiar &
Arellano Gopinath Yue
Moment Data Model (2007) (2006) (2007)
Corr(y, c) (%) 97 93 91 97 n.a.
Corr(ca/y, y) (%) -82 -11 -15 -12 -14
EMBI Std. Dev. (%) 3.07 1.95 10.6 0.12 1.32
EMBI Mean Spread (%) 7.75 1.98 10.4 0.57* 1.84
Std. Dev. short-term spread(%) 1.68 1.95 10.6 0.12 1.32
Mean short-term spread (%) 4.08 1.98 10.4 0.57* 1.84
Corr(y, spread) (%) -76 -35 -22 -2 -18
Corr(ca/y, spread) (%) 75 32 17 38 54
Corr(y, rating) (%) 47 21 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Corr(spread, rating) (%) -81 -66 n.a. n.a. n.a.
*Max value is reported only
The model delivers a standard deviation of spreads that is consistent with
short-term bond data but a lower mean spread (even when compared with short-
term bonds). However, this anomaly of the model has been present in previous
studies as well. Arellano (2007) obtains a much higher mean spread but at the cost
of a standard deviation that is more than 3 times of that observed in the data.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) only report the maximum value of spread recorded
in their simulation and even so this value is only 13% of the mean of short term
spreads and 7% of the average EMBI+. Yue (2007) reports mean spreads than are
also lower than in the data.
The benchmark model is able to capture the countercyclical behavior of in-
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terest rates and the positive correlation between the current account and spreads.
In particular, the correlation of income and spreads is -35 percent and the correla-
tion between the spreads and the current account is 32 percent. A new dimension
considered in this paper is the relation between interest rates, sovereign ratings and
output. Consistent with the observations of the Argentinean economy in the past
decade, ratings are positively correlated with output (corr(y, rating) = 21 percent)
and present a high negative correlation with spreads (corr(spread, rating) = −66
percent).
In summary, the main regularities of emerging economies are that interest
rates are countercyclical, the current account is countercyclical and interest rates
and the current account are positively correlated. The model in this paper matches
the data in that it simultaneously delivers a higher volatility of consumption relative
to output, countercyclical interest rates and a countercyclical current account. It
also displays a positive correlation between interest rates and the current account.
1.9 Conclusion
The average country, among emerging economies has experienced 3 defaults every
100 years, and sustains an average external debt to output ratio around 58%. Pre-
vious models of sovereign debt are unable to account jointly for the debt to output
ratio and the observed default frequency. The combination of government reputa-
tion with endogenous periods of exclusion and debt renegotiation produce a debt to
output ratio at least 100% higher than in previous models and accounts for 50% of
the ratio observed in the data.
The information structure and the endogenous determination of default penal-
ties, including recovery rates and periods of exclusion, are essential ingredients to
obtain the main result. In section 1.6, I show that a model with full information and
zero recovery rates generates an equilibrium debt to output ratio that is only 34% of
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the benchmark model. In addition, a model with full information and endogenous
recovery generates a debt to output ratio that is 72% of the model with private
information. In these models, reputation has no value because political states are
observable, thus a repayment decision per se has no effect on future prices.
In section 1.8, I show that the model account for the main regularities of
emerging economies such as a higher volatility of consumption relative to output,
countercyclical interest rates and a countercyclical current account. It also displays
a positive correlation between interest rates and the current account.
In this paper, I show that a model of reputation and endogenous recovery
rates accounts for a large fraction of the debt to output ratio observed in the data.
However, other puzzles are still present. The main anomaly of the paper is the low
average interest rate (and spreads) generated in equilibrium. From Table 1.8 it is
evident that previous studies are also unable to generate the observed mean spread.
Other channels beyond the one identified here could affect the borrowing decisions
of the government and lenders’ expectations of the risk of default. The exploration





of Rising Wage Inequality1
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we ask whether the observed increase in wage inequality and the
decrease in median to mean wages can explain some part of the increase in transfers
to low earnings quintiles and increase in effective tax rates for high earnings quintiles
in the U.S. over the past few decades. To answer this question we use a model with
uninsurable, idiosyncratic shocks to labor efficiency similar to Aiyagari [5]. With
incomplete markets, the rising wage dispersion generates more individual consump-
tion dispersion and an increased role for government insurance (transfer) programs.
The benefits of such transfer programs may be offset by the costs associated with
financing through distortionary taxation. We use a political recursive competitive
equilibrium concept pioneered in Krusell, et. al. [73]. Specifically, political out-
comes are endogenously determined by a median voter who chooses a proportional
1This chapter borrows extensively from a joint project with P. Dean Corbae and Burhanettin
Kuruscu (see Corbae, D’Erasmo and Kuruscu [40]).
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tax rate that is required to be consistent with a sequential equilibrium of a com-
petitive economy. Obviously, the difficulty in the analysis arises out of the fact
that the endogenous policy outcomes and the endogenous evolution of the wealth
distribution are interconnected. Idiosyncratic uncertainty greatly complicates the
determination of the median voter.
The specific experiment we consider is to choose a transition matrix to match
observed mobility in wages between 1978 to 1979 in the PSID dataset and show
that these numbers are consistent with “low” inequality. Then we reparameterize
the transition matrix to match the observed mobility between 1995 to 1996 and
show that these numbers are consistent with “high” inequality. Then we ask what
proportional tax rates the median voter would choose for each of the two parame-
terizations. At this new tax rate, we compute the changes in effective tax rates by
quintile (normalized by the middle quintile). Since during the 1979 to 1996 period
the wage data was also characterized by a sustained decrease in the median to mean
wage, there are potentially important differences between proportional taxes chosen
by a median voter and a utilitarian planner. We find that in general the results from
the median voter model are closer to the data than those chosen from a utilitarian
mechanism.
The main difference from previous work in this area is the introduction of
idiosyncratic uncertainty in a political-economy model.2 For instance, what many
consider to be the canonical political economy model by Krusell and Rios-Rull [74]
assumes that households are heterogeneous in their earnings but there are complete
markets so that there is no uncertainty in the present discounted value of earnings.
Complete markets also implies that the differences in initial wealth between house-
holds persist indefinitely (i.e. it is possible to choose an exogenous initial wealth
2There are several papers which consider a social planner’s utilitarian choice of exogenous taxes
with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic uncertainty. See for example, Aiyagari [6] and Domeij
and Heathcote [44].
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distribution that is consistent with a steady state which replicates itself every period
from t = 0) which allows them to identify the median voter ex-ante. In a related
paper by Azzimonti et. al. [15], the authors use a first-order approach and show
that aggregate state can be summarized by the mean and median capital holdings
in a model without uncertainty. They also include a proof that their environment
yields single-peaked preferences. The closest paper to ours is Aiyagari and Peled [7].
They consider a model with idiosyncratic uncertainty, however they restrict off-the-
equilibrium path beliefs to be those from the steady state rather than sequentially
rational beliefs.
The paper is organized as follows. The data facts are presented in section 2.
The model is presented in section 3. In section 4, we discuss how we calibrate the
benchmark model. In section 5 we present a quantitative experiment to study the
effect of the increase in earnings volatility on tax choices. Finally, in Section 6 we
conduct a welfare analysis.
2.2 Data Facts
It is well documented that there has been an increase in wage inequality during the
past three decades. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, in Figure 1 and
2 we document a substantial increase in the variance of the log-wage as well as a
decline in the median to mean ratio of wages for heads of households between 20 and
59 and who work for no less than 520 hours (see our Data Section for a complete
description of the selection criterion we use).3 We choose this selection criterion
because we will work with a infinitely lived agent model.4 There appear to be two
3There are many papers documenting the rise in wage inequality. See, for example, Autor, et.
al. [14] and Heathcote, et. al. [62].
4As part of a sensitivity analysis, we plan to relax the restriction that heads of households work
for no less than 520 hours. This selection criterion rules out people who are unemployed for long
durations, those out of the labor force, and some students.
59
different regimes in Figure 1; one with low variance until the beginning of the 80’s
where the mean variance of log wages is around 30% and another regime with high
variance from the mid 80’s to 1996 with mean variance approximately equal to 39%
(an increase of more than 30%). From Figure 2, we observe that during the same
period the median to mean ratio displayed a sharp decrease of around 10%.5




























Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Figure 2.1: Increase in wage inequality 1966− 1996.
5We consider 1996 as the second regime date since that year is the last year for which the PSID
provides annual data. Specifically, after 1996, the PSID provides biannual data. Since our model
will be annual, calculations based on two year mobility matrices would underestimate risk.
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Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Figure 2.2: Decrease in median to mean ratio of log wages 1967− 1996.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently published data on effective
federal tax rates in the United States for the past two and a half decades. Given we
are focusing on wages for households between 20 and 59, we consider effective federal
tax rates for the entire population less elderly (defined as having at least one head
over the age of 65 and no children under 18).6 The federal effective tax rate is the
sum of all tax types paid by households. The effective tax rate is defined to be the
tax liability of a household divided by its post transfer (but pre-tax) income, which
we will denote It. It is comprised of effective individual income tax rates, effective
social insurance taxes, effective corporate income taxes, and effective excise taxes.
6Again see our Data Section for a complete description of the data and the selection criterion
we use.
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One of the important facts that we observe is that redistribution through the tax
system in the U.S. has increased after the 1980’s. Figure 3 illustrates the effective
tax rates paid by each income quintile (normalized by the effective tax rate paid by
the middle income quintile). It is clear from the figure that while the effective tax
rate for the higher income quintiles increased relative to that of the middle quintile,
the effective tax paid for the lower income quintiles declined relative to that of the
middle quintile. For example, the effective tax rate for the highest quintile rose from
around 1.38 times the value of that payed by the middle quintile in 1979 to around
1.45 times it in 1996 (an increase of 5%). At the same time the relative effective tax
rate for the lowest quintile decreased by more than 35% (from 0.5 times the value
of that payed by the middle quintile to 0.32 times it).
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Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Figure 2.3: Effective Federal Tax Rate by quintiles 1979− 2004.
The CBO also provides data on before-tax and after-tax income for each
income quintile. As an alternative measure of redistribution, we note that pre-tax
income inequality between quintiles (i.e. variance of log pre-tax income) increased
by 21.02 log points from 1979 to 1996 while after-tax income inequality increased
by 15.87 log points over that same period.
The relative changes in effective taxes by each quintile we see in Figure
3 could be due to several reasons. First, for given income levels, changes in the
tax code may create more redistribution. Second, for a given tax rate schedule,
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increases in income inequality can generate more redistribution since the tax system
is progressive. For example, increases in income of higher quintiles could generate
increases in effective taxes because people in those quintiles move up the tax schedule
facing higher marginal tax rates. The opposite could happen if lower quintiles
experience declines in their income; they move down the tax schedule and face
lower marginal tax rates.
Since effective federal income taxes make up the largest percentage (at least
half) of effective federal taxes, in order to gain some insight into how much the
changes in effective taxes in Figure 3 are due to income changes versus changes
in the tax code, we use a decomposition of effective federal income tax rates from
a paper by Harris, et. al. [59].7 Specifically, the authors decompose the change
in effective income taxes for all households into changes due to the change in the
tax code and changes due to other factors such as income and demographics. To
understand how much of the redistribution we see in Figure 3 is due to changes
in the tax code versus income changes, we use their data in the following way. We
calculate the effective income tax from 1979 to 2000 due solely to changes in income,
given estimates in Harris, et. al. [59].8 Figure 2.4 illustrates the normalized actual
effective income taxes (solid red line) and normalized income taxes that would arise
due only to changes in income (dashed black line). As evident in Figure 2.4, the
changes in effective taxes due only to changes in income are rather small and most
of the widening seems to be due to changes in the tax code.
7To see that effective income taxes compose the largest percentage of total effective taxes, see
Table 1A in http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7718/SupplementalTables.xls.
8Specifically, ∆eiq79,00(Income) is simply the sum of the column entitled “All Income Adjust-
ments” in Table 4 of Harris, et. al. [59]
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Due to Income Changes
Figure 2.4: Decomposition of Effective Income Tax Rate by quintiles 1979− 2000.
In summary, as is clear from Figures 1 through 4, changes in wage inequality
may have important implications for changes in effective tax rates as part of a
redistributive or social insurance mechanism. We now turn to a simple incomplete













where ct denotes consumption, nt ∈ [0, 1] denotes labor supply in period t, and
β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. We assume that the period utility function has the











where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and ν is the intertemporal (Frisch)
elasticity of labor supply.
Production takes place with a constant return to scale function, whose inputs
are capital and labor
Yt = F (Kt, Nt) = Kαt N
1−α
t (2.3)
where capital letters denote aggregates. The final good can be used for consumption
or investment. Capital depreciates at rate δ.
Each household faces an uninsurable, idiosyncratic labor efficiency shock
εt ∈ E which evolves according to a finite state markov process Π(εt+1 = ε′|εt = ε).
Household earnings are given by wtεt where wt is a competitively determined wage.
An individual household can self insure by holding kt units of capital which pays
a risk free rate of return rt. Households are allowed to borrow up to an exogenous
borrowing limit b. For simplicity, we assume that the interest paid on borrowings
are tax deductible.
The government taxes household capital holdings and labor income at the
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same proportional rate denoted τt, spends Gt and provides lump-sum transfers de-
noted Tt. The government is assumed to run a balanced budget so that
Gt + Tt = τt [rtKt + wtNt] . (2.4)
2.3.2 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Let the joint distribution of capital and efficiency levels across households be denoted




kt dΓt(kt, εt) (2.5)
and aggregate labor is given by
Nt =
∫
εt ntdΓt(kt, εt). (2.6)
Perfect competition in factor markets implies
rt = αKα−1t N
1−α
t − δ (2.7)
wt = (1− α)Kαt N−αt .
The economy-wide resource constraint in each period is given by
Ct + Gt + Kt+1 = Yt + (1− δ)Kt (2.8)
Letting x denote xt and x′ denote xt+1, we can write the household problem
9Since there are no other assets besides capital, the distribution of capital and the distribution
of wealth are identical. We will use these definitions interchangeably.
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recursively as10
V (k, ε; Γ, τ) = max
c,n,k′
u(c, n) + β
∑
ε′
Π(ε′|ε)V (k′, ε′; Γ′, τ ′) (2.11)
s.t.
c + k′ = k + [r(K,N)k + w(K,N)εn] (1− τ) + T
k′ ≥ −b
Γ′ = H(Γ, τ)
τ ′ = Ψ(Γ, τ)
where the perceived law of motion of taxes is given by τt+1 = Ψ(Γt, τt). The solution
to the individual’s problem generates decision rules which we denote
10The utility function given in equation (2.2) has the convenient property that the labor sup-
ply choice is independent of the consumption-savings choice. In particular, assuming an interior






It is important to note that the optimal labor supply does not depend on household wealth. This
property has the useful implication that equilibrium aggregate effective labor supply depends only
on the inherited aggregate capital stock, the current tax rate, and the time-invariant distribution











This simplifies the solution of our problem because equilibrium prices become a function of the
aggregate capital stock and tax rates only (as before). With general preferences we would need
another state variable - see appendix B in Krusell and Smith [75] for that case.
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n = η(k, ε; Γ, τ),
c = g(k, ε; Γ, τ) and
k′ = h(k, ε; Γ, τ).
Before moving to the endogenous determination of tax rates via majority
voting, it is useful to state a competitive equilibrium taking as given the law of
motion of taxes.
Definition (RCE). Given Ψ(Γ, τ), a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium is
a set of functions {V, η, g, h,Γ,H, r, w, T} such that:
(i) Given (Γ, τ,H,Ψ), the functions V (·), η(·), g(·) and h(·) solve the hh’s
problem in (2.11);
(ii) Prices are competitively determined (2.7);
(iii) The resource constraint is satisfied
K ′ = KαN1−α + (1− δ)K −
∫
g(k, ε; Γ, τ)dΓ(k, ε)−G
where K and N are defined as in (2.5) and (2.6);
(iv) The government budget constraint (2.4) is satisfied




2.3.3 Politico Economic Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, we endogenize the tax choice. In particular, we allow households to
vote on next period’s tax rate τ ′. Given that households are rational, a decisive voter
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evaluates the equilibrium effects of her choice, calculates the expected discounted
utility associated with each τ ′, and chooses the tax rate which gives her highest
utility. Since the source of household heterogeneity arises from the idiosyncratic
shocks to earnings, we do not know who the median voter is as in the papers of,
for instance, Krusell and Rios-Rull [74], we follow an alternative approach.11 From
each household choice we generate the distribution of “most preferred” tax rates
and provided each household’s derived utility is single-peaked, the median of the
most preferred tax rates is chosen (i.e. it is the Condorcet winner which beats any
alternative tax rate in a pairwise comparison). In this case, what the literature
usually calls the median voter corresponds to the agent with capital holdings and
productivity level that optimally chooses the median tax rate. It is important to
appreciate that in environments with idiosyncratic uncertainty the median voter, in
general, does not correspond to the agent with median capital holdings or median
productivity shock.
To choose the most preferred tax rate, the household must choose among
alternatives. Suppose that the household starts with state vector as before (k, ε,Γ, τ)
and consider a one period deviation for next period’s tax rate to τ ′ not necessarily
given by τ ′ = Ψ(Γ, τ) while taking as given that all future (t + 2) tax choices will
be given by the function Ψ. In that case, the household’s problem is given by
Ṽ (k, ε, Γ, τ, τ ′) = max
c,n,k′
u(c, n) + βEε′|ε
[
V (k′, ε′, Γ′, τ ′)
]
(2.12)
11Only in the case of idiosyncratic transitory efficiency shocks are total resources, (1 + r(1 −
τ))k + wε(1− τ) + T, sufficient to know who the median voter is.
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s.t.




Γ, τ, τ ′
)
where H̃ denotes the law of motion for Γ induced by the deviation, while all future
distributions evolve according to H. Note that the future value function V is given
by the solution to the household problem in (2.11) of the definition of a Recursive
Competitive Equilibrium. A solution to this problem generates
n = η̃(k, ε; Γ, τ, τ ′) , c = g̃(k, ε; Γ, τ, τ ′) and k′ = h̃(k, ε; Γ, τ, τ ′).
It is instructive to understand how the savings choice varies across individual capital
holdings and future tax rates for the evolution of the wealth distribution. Note that
in Figure 5 higher future tax rates for a given k induce a lower level of savings.12
The primary reason why a solution to the politico-economic equilibrium is


































Because of this difficulty, Aiyagari and Peled [7] restricted off-the-equilibrium out-
12The figure plots k′ = eh(k, ε; Γ, τ, τ ′) for ε3 = 1, all evaluated at the steady state distribution Γ
associated with τ.
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Figure 2.5: Decision rules over wealth for different levels of τ ′.
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comes to be steady states. Specifically, Aiyagari and Peled assume that Γ′′ = Γ∗(τ∗)
where Γ∗ denotes the steady state distribution corresponding to tax choice τ ′.
Next we define the solution concept.
Definition (PRCE) A Politico-Economic Recursive Competitive Equilib-
rium is:
(i) a set of functions {V, η, g, h, H,Ψ, r, w, T} that satisfy the definition of a
RCE;
(ii) a set of functions {Ṽ , η̃, g̃, h̃} that solve (2.12), at prices which clear mar-





with continuation values satsifying (i);
(iii) in individual state (k, ε)i, household i′s most preferred tax policy τ i satisfies
τ i = ψ((k, ε)i, Γ, τ) = arg max
τ ′
Ṽ ((k, ε)i, Γ, τ, τ ′); (2.14)
(iv) the policy outcome function τm = Ψ(Γ, τ) = ψ((k, ε)m, Γ, τ) satisfies
∫
I{(k,ε):τ i≥τm}dΓ(k, ε) ≥
1
2∫




Condition (iv) effectively defines the median voter. That is, tax outcomes
are determined by the voter whose most preferred tax rate is the median of the
distribution of most preferred tax rates. To find the median voter, we sort the
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agents by their most preferred tax rates and then we integrate the distribution of
most preferred tax rates over (k, ε) using Γ(k, ε).
For the existence of this type of politico economic equilibrium, preferences
need to be single peaked.13 Single-peakedness simply says that there is an alterna-
tive τ i that represents a peak of satisfaction and, moreover, satisfaction increases
as we approach this peak. We do not have a general proof of single peakedness;
however, we check that in the calibrated economy we solve numerically, the indi-
rect utility function satisfies this property for every (k, ε,Γ, τ) including those off
the equilibrium path.14 Graphically we can see the importance of this condition
from Figure 6. There we plot the indirect utility function Ṽ (k, ε,Γ, τ, τ ′) over τ ′
for different households (k, ε) evaluated at τ = 0.365 and the steady state distribu-
tion Γ associated with that τ. Generally, single-peakedness is used to establish that
the median ranked preferred tax rate beats any other feasible tax rate in pairwise
comparisons so that the median voter theorem applies.
13For household i in individual state (k, ε)i and aggregate state Γ, τ , preferences of voter i
are single peaked if the following condition holds: if τ̃ ≤ τ̂ ≤ τ i or if τ̃ ≥ τ̂ ≥ τ i, then
eV ((k, ε)i, Γ, τ, τ̃) ≤ eV ((k, ε)i, Γ, τ, τ̂).
14The papers by Azzimonti, et. al. [15] and Basetto and Benhabib [16] have proofs of single-
peakedness in nonstochastic environments.
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Figure 2.6: Single Peaked Preferences.
In our environment, the median voter identity is endogenous. In models
without uncertainty or with complete markets, an agent with mean capital holdings
would choose zero redistribution. However, in our model, even agents with the mean
capital holding will vote for a positive tax rate for insurance reasons. A higher
government transfer allows agents with low wealth to smooth consumption. There
are also general equilibrium considerations. As τ increases, the household decision
rule implies lower capital accumulation which results in a higher interest rate and
lower wage rate. If the latter effect dominates, the distribution will compress.
Finally, we restrict attention to steady state equilibria of the above definition.
Specifically,
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Definition (SSPRCE). A Steady State PRCE is a PRCE which satisfies Γ∗ =
H(Γ∗, τ∗) and τ∗ = Ψ(Γ∗, τ∗).
2.3.4 Alternative Mechanisms
We compare our results with three alternative mechanisms. First, we analyze what
would be the equilibrium tax rate if it is chosen by sequentially maximizing average
welfare, i.e. the solution to a planner’s problem with no commitment. We call
it the utilitarian mechanism with no commitment. In this case and identical to
the equilibrium considered in the previous section, no restrictions are imposed over
the evolution of tax rates. Second, we consider median voter and the utilitarian
mechanisms with commitment, that is where only a one time change in tax rates is
allowed. More specifically, tax rates are restricted to be fixed after the first period.
Utilitarian Mechanism with no commitment
The planner sequentially chooses a future tax rate to maximize aggregate welfare.
The definition of equilibrium is identical to that of a PRCE but where the condition
that defines the equilibrium tax function, condition (iv), is replaced by:
Ψun(Γ, τ) = arg max
τ ′
∫
Ṽ (k, ε,Γ, τ, τ ′)dΓ(k, ε).
with all continuation values evaluated according to the equilibrium function (e.g.




We consider two other tax choice mechanisms with commitment.15 The first is
a simple restriction on the PRCE defined above. In particular, the median voter
chooses a future permanent tax rate. It is as if the government can commit to the
tax rate. Specifically, the only constraint on problem PRCE is that all continua-
tion values are evaluated according to the “identity” function (that is, τt+n+1 =
Ψ(Γt+n, τt+n) = τt+n, for all Γt+n and τt+n, n = 1, 2, ... with τt+1 = ΨO(Γ, τ) =
arg maxτ ′ Ṽ ((k, ε)m, Γ, τ, τ ′). Note that in this case we restrict only the evolution
of tax rates. The evolution of the joint distribution Γ is given by the equilibrium
function H(Γ, τ). It is still necessary to compute the entire transition of prices for
each possible tax change. We call this case the one-time median voter tax choice.
Even for the one-time voting case, there is a nontrivial transition path for
the wealth distribution similar to (2.13). Specifically, we have
Γ′ = H̃
(























Figure 7 displays the transition paths of aggregate capital for different one-time
changes in tax rates.16 The starting point is the aggregate capital corresponding to
the invariant distribution Γ∗(τ∗) with constant taxes for the initial SS calibration.
Higher future tax rate choices τ̂ > τ∗ imply aggregate capital paths that are mono-
15Besides providing an interesting theoretical contrast to the sequential problem, from a compu-
tational standpoint the one-time problem is much quicker and can serve as a useful starting point
for the sequential case.
16This corresponds to point (3.b) in the computational algorithm and the discussion immediately
following for one-time tax changes.
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tonically decreasing. Higher future tax rates generate decreases in individual savings
that are reflected in these paths to the new invariant distribution Γ̂(τ̂) associated
with τ̂ . The effects of the tax change disappear slowly (about 50 model periods or
years).























τ′ = τ = 0.3415
τ′ = 0.40
τ′ = 0.47
Figure 2.7: Transitions at initial steady state τ
To contrast to this mechanism, we consider a one-time utilitarian tax choice.
In this case, the planner chooses a future constant tax rate to maximize aggregate
welfare:
Ψuc(Γ, τ) = arg max
τ ′
∫
Ṽ (k, ε, Γ, τ, τ ′)dΓ(k, ε).
with all continuation values evaluated according to the “identity” function (e.g.
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Table 2.1: Preferences and Technology Parameters.
Parameter Value




Capital Share α 0.36
Depreciation Rate δ 0.06
τ ′′ = Ψ(Γ′, τ ′) = τ ′ ∀Γ′, τ ′).
2.4 Calibration
We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy. We can group the parameters in
two different sets: (i) preferences and technology {β, γ, ν, χ, α, δ}; and (ii) the wage
generating process {E,Π}. The first group is set to standard values in the RBC
literature. The second set of parameters is obtained by directly computing mobility
(i.e. transition) matrices for hourly wage rates in the PSID data from 1978 to 1979
(corresponding to the low inequality regime) and from 1995 to 1996 (corresponding
to the high inequality regime).
2.4.1 Preference and Technology parameters
Some of the preference and technology parameters (β, γ, α, and δ) are set to stan-
dard values for the U.S. economy when using a neoclassical growth of model. The
intertemporal Frisch elasticity ν is estimated to be between 0.1 and 0.45 for prime
age males by McCurdy (1981). We take ν to be 0.3. The parameter χ is set so that
aggregate effective labor supply is equal to 0.3 in 1979 as in Heathcote [61]. The
value of the parameters are displayed in table (2.1). The time period chosen for the
model is four years.
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Table 2.2: Transition Matrix for 1978-1979.
1 2 3 4 5
(6.84849) (10.93091) (14.88623) (19.51769) (30.70179)
1
(6.728081) 0.672284357 0.23663245 0.058679332 0.021755784 0.010648077
2
(10.97251) 0.230851716 0.491191789 0.213694853 0.043428309 0.020833333
3
(14.84763) 0.058963349 0.217834688 0.524306088 0.152507284 0.046388591
4
(19.40453) 0.032651184 0.041465471 0.15053269 0.575764544 0.199586112
5
(31.55262) 0.007289748 0.010282382 0.053330264 0.207105586 0.72199202
2.4.2 Wage process
We set the number of elements in E to five since much of the effective tax rate
data we consider is in terms of quintiles (so E = {ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4, ε5} where εi refers
to average wage rate of individuals in wage quintile i). We use the PSID data
to obtain the annual mobility matrices (transition probabilities) from 1978 to 1979
and from 1995 to 1996. We restrict our sample to household heads who are between
ages 20 and 59, whose annual hours of work is between 520 hours and 5096, and
who earn at least half of the minimum wage, and who are in the sample for both
years for the years that we calculate the transition matrices. Moreover, we use
population weights when we compute our transition matrices. Given this we obtain
the following mobility matrices
Since average wages in each year are not the same we take the average of
the two consecutive years as our εi. For example, ε1 for the first transition matrix
is (6.84849+6.728081)/2.
Our selection criteria implies that the variance of log wages increases from
0.28 before 1979 to 0.37 in 1996 while the median to mean ratio declines from 0.9 to
0.79. For comparison, Heathecote et. al. [62] report that the variance of log wages
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Table 2.3: Transition Matrix for 1995-1996.
1 2 3 4 5
(6.643506) (10.55364) (14.33294) (19.87673) (38.81428)
1
(6.343664) 0.714443533 0.199974569 0.03948081 0.021702287 0.024398801
2
(10.27176) 0.181288293 0.514990414 0.233577389 0.048408029 0.021735875
3
(13.78551) 0.0491733 0.266339048 0.497278842 0.164298927 0.022909882
4
(19.16724) 0.039455357 0.012745583 0.19145693 0.61755159 0.13879054
5
(38.0832) 0.017569988 0.004346983 0.03262434 0.146594941 0.798863747
increased from 0.28 to 0.39 and median to mean ratio declined from 0.9 to 0.76. To
get a sense of the approximation error associated with our transition matrices, we
note that the implied ratio of median to mean wages are 0.885 and 0.800 in 1979
and 1996 respectively and the implied variance of log wages are 0.265 and 0.34 in
1979 and 1996 respectively. Since we are grouping individuals in wage brackets,
it is expected that the level and changes in these inequality measures implied by
these transition matrices are smaller. However, the approximation error is still quite
small.
2.4.3 Data Description for Wage Process
Here we describe the data and steps we use to construct labor earnings tranisition
matrices: one for transitions from 1978 to 1979 and another from 1995 to 1996.
There are five states in each year. Household heads in the first state have the lowest
real hourly wages and those in the fifth state have the highest real hourly wages. The
publicly available data set we use is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). To
make it more convenient for anyone who wants to replicate our results, the specific
PSID variable names are included. The weight variables we use are the 1979 weight
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(V7451) and the 1996 weight (ER12084). 17
1. The nominal hourly wages of household heads are calculated by taking the
nominal annual labor earnings divided by annual work hours. The nominal
annual labor earnings of household heads (V6767, V7413) and annual work
hours of household heads (V6336, V6934) are readily given for 1978 and 1979.
To obtain these two measures for the years 1995 and 1996, the following extra
steps need to be taken:
• Add up labor earnings from various sources to obtain nominal annual
labor earnings of household heads: wages (ER8256, ER11150), bonuses
(ER8263, ER11157), commissions (ER8266, ER11160), overtime (ER8264,
ER11158), professional practice or trade (ER8270, ER11163), tips (ER8265,
ER11159), market gardening (ER8286, ER11179), roomers or boarders
(ER8302, ER11195), and extra jobs (ER8318, ER11211).
• If household heads are currently working in the year when surveyed, the
annual work hours in the previous year are the number of weeks worked
per year for main jobs (ER7317, ER10231) times the number of hours
worked per week for main jobs (ER7320, ER10232) plus the number
of weeks worked per year for extra jobs (ER7327, ER10239) times the
number of hours worked per week for extra jobs (ER7328, ER10240). If
the household heads are not currently working, all the above variables
are coded zero.
• If the household heads are not currently working in the year when sur-
veyed, the annual work hours in the previous year can be obtained sim-
ilarly by taking the the number of weeks worked per year for main jobs
17We note that the surveys asked households the history of previous year instead of the year in
which the surveys were conducted.
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(ER7562, ER10470) times the number of hours worked per week for main
jobs (ER7565, ER10471) plus the number of weeks worked per year for
extra jobs (ER7572, ER10478) times the number of hours worked per
week for extra jobs (ER7573, ER10479). If the household heads are cur-
rently working, all the above variables are coded zero.
• The annual work hours not conditional on current working status for a
household head is the larger number of the two calculations above because
by construction the smaller number will be zero. Note that hours worked
per week should be treated as missing values if coded as 998 or 999. The
weeks worked per year should be treated as missing values if coded as 98
or 99.
2. Next, nominal hourly wages are adjusted to be in 1992 dollars. The nominal
hourly wages are either deflated or inflated using the Consumer Price Index
- All Urban Consumer (CPI-U) from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
3. The sample selection criteria are: (1) the age of the household head (V6462,
V7067, ER7006, and ER10009) is between 20 and 59, (2) the household head
works for no less than 520 hours and no more than 5096 hours annually, (3) the
nominal hourly wage of the household head is greater than half of the federal
minimum wage rate (available from U.S. Department of Labor, Employment
Standards Administration Wage and Hour Division), (4) the nominal annual
labor earnings of the household head are less than $99999 for the years 1978
and 1979 and less than $999996 for the years 1995 and 1996, (5) the household
satisfies all of the above criteria in both years 1978 and 1979 and/or in both
years 1995 and 1996.
4. For the households who satisfy all the sample selection criteria, the state they
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are in can now be assigned for each year. If the real hourly wage earned by
the household head is higher than at least 20*(i-1)% but no more than 20*i%
of the samples, this household is in the ith state, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
5. Finally, we are ready to build the 5-by-5 transition matrix Π for the year
1978-79. Each row or column represents a state. The frequencies of each
cell in the matrix are counted. If a household is in the ith state in 1978
and in the jth state in 1979, then he will be counted one in cell Π(i, j).
For each cell, we divide the counts by total counts of the entire row the cell
is in to get the sample proportions conditional on the state of year 1978.
The transition matrix is completed when the frequencies are replaced by the
conditional sample proportions for all cells. Repeat to get the transition matrix
for the year 1995-96.
2.4.4 Government Spending
We next calibrate certain parameters of the left hand side of the government budget
constraint (2.4). Since our model abstracts from retirement and the reasons for
federal government spending like defense, we include social security transfers as part
of government spending (i.e. it is a resource lost on agents not in the model). Using
this categorization for 1979, 5.2% of GDP was associated with social security and
9.1% of GDP was associated with government purchases yielding G1979 = 9.1+5.2 =
14.3. In 1996, 7% of GDP was associated with social security and 5.3% of GDP was
associated with government purchases yielding G1996 = 5.3 + 7 = 12.3.18
18The data comes from Table 15.5 (Total Government Expenditures by Major Category of
Expenditure as Percentages of GDP: 1948–2006) on the U.S. Government Printing Office web page
under Budget of the United States Government: Historical Tables Fiscal Year 2008. The link to
the table is http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/sheets/hist15z5.xls.
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2.4.5 Data Description for Federal Effective Tax Rates
The effective tax rate measures the percentage of household income going to the
federal government from taxes. The income measure is comprehensive household
income, which comprises pretax cash income plus income from other sources. Pretax
cash income is the sum of wages, salaries, self-employment income, rents, taxable
and nontaxable interest, dividends, realized capital gains, cash transfer payments,
and retirement benefits plus taxes paid by businesses (corporate income taxes; the
employer’s share of Social Security, Medicare, and federal unemployment insurance
payroll taxes); and employees’ contributions to 401(k) retirement plans. Other
sources of income include all in-kind benefits (Medicare, Medicaid, employer-paid
health insurance premiums, food stamps, school lunches and breakfasts, housing
assistance, and energy assistance). Households with negative income are excluded
from the lowest income category but are included in totals.
We calculate federal effective taxes for nonelderly households. To do that we
use Table 2C and 4C from from “Effective Federal Tax Rates for All Households”
from http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=7000&type=1. Table 2C reports the
number of households, average pretax income, and average after-tax income for
each income quintile for households with children, i.e. a household that has at
least one member under age 18. Table 4C reports the same statistics for nonelderly
childless households, i.e. a household headed by a person under age 65 and with
no member under age 18. The two groups make up all nonelderly households plus
elderly housholds with children under 18. The CBO does not provide data that
would allow us to exlude elderly housholds with children under 18. However, the
size of the elderly housholds with children under 18 group is rather small and is
unlikely to affect our calculations. Therefore, we combine the two groups to represent
nonelderly households. Using number of households, average pre-tax income, and
average after-tax income for each quintile in each group, we calculate total pre-
85
tax income and total tax liability (pre-tax income minus after-tax income) for each
quintile in each group and use these to compute the total pre-tax income and total
tax liability of the combined group. Then we divide total tax liability of each quintile
by the total pre-tax income of that quintile in the combined group to get the effective
taxes by quintile for the combined group.
2.5 Quantitative Exercise
To assess the quantitative significance of the change in inequality for changes in
effective taxes, we feed the transition matrix for wage rates from 1978 to 1979 into
the model to deliver a steady state effective tax rate in the initial regime. Then we
feed the transition matrix for wage rates from 1995 to 1996 into the model to deliver
a steady state effective tax rate in the final regime.
After solving the saving decision problem of the household we can solve
problem (2.14) in the definition of PRCE to obtain the tax rate that maximizes each
agent’s utility. In Figure 2.8 we observe the most preferred tax rates as a function
of k for different levels of ε. The feasible set of tax rates is restricted to the interval
[0, 1]. For a fixed level of wealth k, the function τ ′ = ψ(k, ε,K, τ) is decreasing in ε.
That is, for a given level of assets, an agent with the lowest productivity ε1 will vote
for a higher tax rate than an agent with higher productivity levels ε2 to ε5. This
implies that the fraction of households in each productivity level is critical for the
determination of the optimal tax rate.
Clearly if two households have equal productivity levels at the time of the tax
reform, but different levels of wealth k, the wealthier household has more to lose from
an increase in tax rates. This effect is seen as a movement along τ ′ = ψ(k, ε,K, τ)
for a given ε in Figure 2.8. The figure shows that the optimal tax rate is decreasing
in the level of wealth for a given level of labor productivity. Wealthier agents receive
a large portion of their income from the return on capital and therefore changing
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the tax rate affects the expected net return. In general, this effect offsets the effect
of the increase in the government transfers mentioned above.
Finally, Figure 2.8 shows that it is possible for households with two different
(k, ε) to choose the same tax rate τ ′ (this is seen as a horizontal slice). For instance,
it is evident that a household with (1.2, ε3), one with (1.9, ε2) and one with (2.2, ε1)
choose the same tax rate τ ′ = 0.365.
We can summarize the tax choice of a typical agent as follows:
1. For a given (k, Γ, τ), ψ(k, ε, Γ, τ) is decreasing in ε; that is, a household with
a lower wages will choose a higher τ ′.
2. For a given (εi, Γ, τ), ψ(k, ε, Γ, τ) is decreasing in k; that is, a household with
a lower wealth will choose a higher τ ′.
3. For a given (Γ, τ), there may be households with different wealth and wages
who choose the same τ ′.
87






























Figure 2.8: Most Preferred Tax Rate.
To take the theoretical marginal tax rate τ to the data, we use the CBO’s
definition of effective tax rates, which we denote e. It is defined to be the amount
of tax liability divided by pre-tax income including transfers. In the data, the tax
liability is reported net of earned income tax credit and this is not included in the
transfer measure. That is, from the total transfer T some fraction φ ∈ [0, 1] is
computed as a credit in income taxes and the rest (1− φ) is finally distributed as a
pure transfer. Thus, for accounting reasons, let Υ = φT denote the earned income
credit and T f = (1 − φ)T denote pure transfers. In the context of our model, the
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(rk + wε)dΓ(k, ε)−Υ∫
(rk + wε)dΓ(k, ε) + T f
. (2.15)
The parameter φ is calibrated as follows. At the given parameters, {β, σ, α, δ, E,Π},
we obtain the equilibrium marginal tax rate τ . We then choose φ to match the ratio
of Total Earned Income Tax Credit to GDP (φT/Y ) in 1996. The IRS reports that
the Total Earned Income Tax Credit is $22.1 billion. Nominal GDP from NIPA ta-
bles is $7816.9 billion. To make a fair comparison between the different mechanisms
and because each mechanism generates a different marginal tax rate (and transfers),
φ varies from one mechanism to the other. Specifically, we find φ = 0.0109 for the
sequential mechanism and φ = 0.0117 for the utilitarian mechanism.
Equation 2.15 implies that the effective tax rate increases with income. We
illustrate this simple progressive tax system in Figure 2.9. The slope of the red
dotted line gives the effective tax rate. As can be seen from this figure the effective
tax rate increases as income increases even if the marginal tax rate is independent
of income (as in the case of our model).
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Slope = Effective Tax Rate
Figure 2.9: Progressive Tax System
Table (2.4) presents the changes in effective income tax rates by income
quintile when normalized by the middle quintile, the analogue of our Figure 3. The
model is not capable of matching the big changes that we observe in the data for
the lowest quintiles and tends to overpredict changes in the highest quintile.
As suggested in Section 2, rising inequality by itself could potentially gen-
erate a rise in effective tax rates without any change in the marginal tax rate τ
through the effect of changes in labor income working through a progressive tax
system. While the estimates by Harris, et. al. [59] we present in Figure 2.4 suggest
that the changes in effective taxes due only to changes in income are rather small,
we can run a counterfactual to decompose how much of the change in effective tax
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Table 2.4: Effective Income Tax Rate by Quintile (Normalized by Middle Quintile)
Effective Tax Rates Quintiles Normalized %∆
1979 1996
Q1 (lowest) 0.4997 0.320 -35.91
Q2 0.8233 0.776 -5.76
Data Q3 (middle) 1 1 0
Q4 1.1165 1.117 0.05
Q5 (highest) 1.3839 1.454 5.08
Q1 (lowest) 0.8068 0.7259 -10.02
One-time Q2 0.9355 0.9004 -3.75
Median Voter Q3 (middle) 1.0000 1.0000 0
Q4 1.0479 1.0824 3.29
Q5 (highest) 1.1002 1.1800 7.26
Initial SS Final SS
Q1 (lowest) 0.7943 0.7247 -8.77
One-time Q2 0.9308 0.8997 -3.33
Utilitarian Q3 (middle) 1.0000 1.0000 0
Q4 1.0518 1.0830 6.58
Q5 (highest) 1.1083 1.1812 6.58
Q1 (lowest) 0.7898 0.676 -14.340
Seq. Q2 0.9287 0.878 -5.513
Median Voter Q3 (middle) 1.0000 1.0000 0
Q4 1.0537 1.107 5.030
Q5 (highest) 1.1125 1.234 10.876
Q1 (lowest) 0.760 0.688 -9.504
Seq. Q2 0.917 0.883 -3.761
Utilitarian Q3 (middle) 1.000 1.000 0
Q4 1.065 1.102 3.398
Q5 (highest) 1.136 1.222 7.535
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rates in 1996 is attributable to changes solely in the wage process (something that
is virtually impossible to do in the data) using our model. Specifically, we impose
the sequential equilibrium marginal tax rate chosen by the median voter τ in the
low inequality (1979) regime into a competitive equilibrium from the high inequal-
ity (1996) regime.19 This gives us a counterfactual set of effective tax rates for the
1996 regime that are attributable only to changes in the wage process. We then use
these tax rates to obtain effective tax rates across quintiles and normalize them as
we did earlier. Then we calculate the percentage changes in these counterfactual
normalized tax rates. This gives us the percentage change in normalized tax rates
due to the change in the wage process. Then we compute the ratio of the percent-
age change in counterfactual normalized effective tax rates to percentage change in
actual normalized effective tax rates to obtain the numbers in Table 2.5. As evident
in the table, the sequential mechanism attributes less change in effective tax rates
due to wage changes than the utilitarian mechanism. Thus the results from the se-
quential mechanism are closer to the findings of Harris, et. al. [59] than the results
from the utilitarian mechanism.
There is one key observational difference between our work and the previ-
ous political economy models mentioned in the introduction. Models that do not
19In other words, we simply solve an Aiyagari [6] economy calibrated to 1996 with τ set at the
level implied by our SEQ for 1979.
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incorporate idiosyncratic uncertainty generate a direct relation between wealth and
preferred tax rates; that is, households with more wealth than the median level
always vote for lower taxes and the opposite is true for households with lower than
median wealth. On the other hand, as evident in Figure 2.8, households with dif-
ferent levels of wealth k may vote for the same τ ′. Figure 2.10 shows how agents
vote in our model for different levels of wealth relative to the median voter. The
figure is constructed as follows. After solving for the optimal tax rate we know the
capital holdings of the median voter km (as well as his earnings). Then households
are sorted based on their level of capital relative to km to form two groups: those
with k ≥ km and those with k ≤ km. Finally in each of these two groups, agents are
separated between those who prefer a higher tax rate and those who prefer a lower
tax rate than the median voter. The figure reports the normalized (relative to the
number of households in the k ≥ km group and the k ≤ km groups) fraction who
prefer higher or lower tax rates.
The panel on the left of Figure 2.10 shows the portion of agents with lower
wealth k than the median voter. From this group only 62% vote for higher taxes
(either those with lower earnings or those with extremely low capital and higher
earnings) while 38% vote for lower taxes than the median voter (those with higher
earnings). The panel on the right shows the portion of agents with higher capital
than the median voter. In this case, only 9% vote for higher taxes (those with lower
earnings level) while 91% vote for lower taxes than the median voter (either those




































































Figure 2.10: Distribution of Wealth and Tax Choices.
2.6 Welfare analysis
In this section we assess the welfare gains of endogenizing policy choices in response
to the change in the underlying earnings process. In particular, we ask how much
agents are willing to pay (in consumption equivalent terms) to use the equilibrium
tax function chosen by the median voter in response to the high earnings inequality
environment rather than sticking with the previous tax rates chosen in the low
earnings inequality regime. In some ways, it measures the value of the insurance
provided by a flexible tax policy.
94
More formally, the welfare gain (under mechanism m) for a household in
state (k, ε) is defined as the constant percentage increased in consumption λm(k, ε),
after the increase in wage inequality but under the constant tax rate chosen in
1979 (τm79) that allows the household to achieve the same expected utility as when
taxes are adjusted according to the equilibrium functions of mechanism m in 1996
(Hm(Γ, τ ; E96) and Ψm(Γ, τ ; E96)) - i.e. those derived from the equilibrium with
high wage inequality. Mechanism m can be the one-time utilitarian, one-time median
voter, sequential utilitarian or sequential median voter.
Let Γm79(k, ε;E96) be the steady state distribution when the tax rate is con-
stant at τm79 and the calibration of the wage process correspond to that of year







optimal consumption and labor choice in period t at the steady state distribution
Γm79(k, ε; E96), that is when the tax rate is kept constant at the equilibrium tax rate
of mechanism m in year 1979 (τm79) and the earnings process is that of 1996 (E96).
Let V (k, ε; Γ, τ, Hm(Γ, τ ;E96), Ψm(Γ, τ ; E96)) denote the value of an agent
at state (k, ε) when the equilibrium law of motions for Γ and τ correspond to the
equilibrium law of motion of mechanism m under the 1996 calibration as in equation
(11). Then, the welfare gain λm(k, ε) solves the following equation:
V (k, ε; Γm79(k, ε;E96), τ
m
79,H




βtu(ct(Γm79(k, ε; E96), τ
m
79)(1 + λ
m(k, ε)), nt(Γm79(k, ε; E96), τ
m
79)),
i.e. the welfare gain λm(k, ε) is the constant percentage increase in consumption that
allows the household to obtain the same utility of switching to an economy where
the law of motion corresponds to those of 1996, Hm(Γ, τ, E96) and Ψm(Γ, τ, E96),
starting from the steady state distribution Γm79(k, ε;E96) and tax rate τ
m
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λm(k, ε)dΓm79(dk, dε; E96). (2.17)
Using equations (2.16) and (2.17) we calculate expected welfare gains for households
with various initial combinations of wealth and productivity. These numbers are
computed by first creating a large artificial population, each member of which starts
out with the initial wealth and productivity level of interest. The economy is then
simulated forward (using the appropriate equilibrium sequence for prices and taxes)
under both scenarios for tax policies.20 Table 2.6 displays the average welfare gain
for each mechanism m.
Table 2.6: Welfare Gains




One-time Median Voter 0.33 0.37 0.19
One-time Utilitarian 0.35 0.38 0.10
Seq. Median Voter 0.37 0.46 -0.40
Seq. Utilitarian 0.41 0.44 -0.21
The first thing to notice is that average welfare gains are very different across
mechanisms. From Table 2.6 we observe that while average welfare increases for
mechanisms with commitment (One-time), the opposite result is obtained when we
analyze mechanisms without commitment (Sequential). For example the average
expected welfare gain is equivalent to a permanent increase of 0.19% in the case of
the One-time Median Voter equilibrium versus an average welfare loss of 0.40% in
the case of the Sequential Median Voter.
20To obtain the consumption equivalent, we use 6000 initial combinations for (k, ε) (1200 initial
values for k and the 5 values of ε). For each combination of (k, ε), we simulate the economy forward
for 1000 periods and repeat it 100 times. The consumption equivalent λm(k, ε) is the average over
the 100 repetitions.
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To understand these results and because policy changes redistribute income
and consumption across households differently, in Figure 2.11 we plot the welfare
gain over wealth for different wage levels for the Sequential Median Voter mecha-
nism.21 This figure shows that welfare gains are decreasing in wealth, i.e at a given
wage level, as wealth increases the welfare gain decreases. The increase in inequality
is associated with an increase in τ . Keeping wages constant, as the fraction of in-
come coming from capital gains increases, agents suffer more from a tax increase, so
the welfare gain decreases. Furthermore, we observe that welfare gains are decreas-
ing in wage levels, i.e. at a given wealth level, as the wage increases the welfare gain
decreases. The intuition here is similar, keeping wealth constant, as the fraction
of taxable income (in this case coming from labor) increases the welfare measure
decreases.
21A similar figure can be obtained for the other mechanisms.
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Figure 2.11: Welfare Gains λ(k, ε)
Given all the heterogeneity in the model, it is important to note that the
identity of the median voter in this economy corresponds to an agent with (k =
1.2, ε3) and λ(k = 1.2, ε3) > 0; that is the median voter is in favor of the reform.
Because the fraction of agents is not constant across wealth and wage levels, in
Figure 2.12 we provide a histogram over welfare gains. We observe that around
60% of the population prefer the status quo, i.e. they obtain a negative welfare
gain. Moreover, the range for losses is bigger than the range of gains. In particular,
we note that expected losses are larger in absolute value than the average welfare
gain. In Figure 2.13 we decompose this histogram by different wage levels. We
observe that most of the winners correspond to agents with ε1 and most of the
losers correspond to agents with ε5.
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Figure 2.12: Histogram Welfare Gains λ(k, ε)
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Figure 2.13: Histogram Welfare Gains λ(k, ε) by wage levels
2.7 Computational Algorithm
We now outline our algorithm for computing equilibria numerically. As in Krusell
and Smith [75], we deal with the high dimensionality of the distribution by ap-
proximating Γ by a finite set of moments. One moment is the aggregate (or mean)
capital stock K since this determines prices households face. The other moment
is median after-tax income denoted γ defined by (1 − τ)[rk + wε] since this helps
forecast the decisive voter and the evolution of the endogenous tax rate. Agents
thus perceive the law of motion for K ′, γ′m and τ ′ to be given by the functions
H(K, γ, τ), G(K, γ, τ) and Ψ(K, γ, τ) respectively. Using this approximation we
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can re-formulate the household problem in an RCE as:





Π(ε′|ε)V (k′, ε′,K ′, γ′, τ ′) (2.18)
s.t.
c + k′ = k + (1− τ) [r(K)k + w(K)ε] + T (K, τ)
K ′ = H(K, γ, τ)
γ′ = G(K, γ, τ)
τ ′ = Ψ(K, γ, τ)
The solution to this problem are the functions h(k, ε, K, γ, τ) and V (k, ε, K, γ, τ).
The one period deviation problem in (2.12) can be similarly redefined.








c + k′ = k + [r(K)k + w(K)ε] (1− τ) + T,
K ′ = H̃
(





K, γ, τ, τ ′
)
.
The solution to this problem yields functions h̃(k, ε, K, γ, τ, τ ′) and Ṽ (k, ε, K, γ, τ, τ ′).
The distribution Γ is a probability measure on (S, βS) where S = [0, k̄]× E
and βS is the Borel σ−algebra. Thus, for B ∈ βS , Γ(B) indicates the mass of
agents whose individual state vectors lie in B. For reference, here we also defined
the operator Φ : M(S) → M(S) where M(S) is the space of probability measures
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An SSPRCE must be contained in the following set of stationary equilibria.
Let τj ∈ {τ1, ..., τJ} be a grid of tax rates in [0, 1] and let Γss(τj) be an associated
stationary distribution which solves RCE for τ ′ = τ = τj . This procedure generates
a set of stationary distributions and associated tax rates SS = {Γss(τj), τj}Jj=1.
Simply put, this is like solving for the steady state of an Aiyagari [5] model for a
grid of exogenous constant taxes.
1. Let Ψn(K, γ, τ) be the tax function at iteration n. For n = 1, we set this equal
to a constant.
2. Given Ψn(K, γ, τ), solve a RCE. That is, let Hs(K, γ, τ) and Gs(K, γ, τ) be the
functions associated with the law of motion for aggregate capital and median
after tax income at iteration s. For s = 1 we set these to a constant.
(a) solve for household decision rules (in particular saving hs(k, ε, K, γ, τ))
in problem (2.18).
(b) use the operator Φ defined in (2.20) and Ψn(K, γ, τ) to generate a joint
sequence of transitional distributions Γη and tax rates τη for η = 1, ..., Υ
starting from Γ0 = Γss(τj) and τ0 = τj for each of the j = 1, ..., J possible
tax rates. We take Υ large enough to ensure that (ΓΥ, τΥ) ∈ SS.
(c) Use the J sequences of transitional distributions and taxes {Γη, τη}Υη=1
to generate a sequence of {Kη, γη, τη}J×Υn=1 . Run a linear regression on
this sequence to update Hs and Gs as in Krusell and Smith [75]. If the
updated Hs and Gs are close enough to the previous iteration, go to step
3, otherwise set s = s + 1 and go to step 2 with the updated functions.
3. Solve a PRCE.
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(a) From step 2, we know V (k, ε, K, γ, τ) which depends on Ψn(K, γ, τ) since
it is in the constraint set in (2.18). Given this, we solve the one period
deviation problem (2.19) starting from Γ0 = Γss(τj) and tau0 = τj for
each of j = 1, ..., J in order to generates τ1. Using the operator Φ evalu-
ated at decision rules h̃(k, ε, K0, γ0, τ0, τ1) obtain Γ1 where K0 and γ0 are
obtained from Γ0. The next period’s distribution and tax rate, (Γ2, τ2),
are obtained by repeating the same steps starting at (Γ1, τ1). Continue
in this way to compute the transitional sequence {Γη, τη}Υη=0.
(b) Use {Γη, τη}Υη=0 to generate the sequence {Kη, γη, τη}J×Υn=1 . Run a linear
regression on this sequence to update Ψn. If the updated Ψn is close
enough to the previous iteration, go to step 4, otherwise set n = n + 1
and go to step 1 with the updated functions.
4. Having solved for the functions H, G, and Ψ, solve for steady state K∗, γ∗,
and τ∗ that solves the three equations:
K∗ = H(K∗, γ∗, τ∗)
γ∗ = G(K∗, γ∗, τ∗)
τ∗ = Ψ(K∗, γ∗, τ∗).
One-time voting simply restricts τη = τ1 for all η > 1 in step 3a and uses
(2.18) to generate the sequence {Γη, τη}Υη=0 with τη = τ1for all η > 1.
2.7.1 Computed Equilibrium
In this section we present the computed median voter sequential equilibrium for
the Final Steady State calibration. We approximated the evolution of the wealth
distribution on and off-the-equilibrium by a finite number of moments: mean capital,
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a measure of the median and the tax rate. In particular, the laws of motion we
consider are:
• Law of motion of aggregate capital, function H
K ′ = a0 + a1K + a2zm + a3τ (2.21)
• Law of motion of median total resources, function G
z′m = b0 + b1K + b2zm + b3τ (2.22)
• Law of motion of taxes, function Ψ
τ ′ = d0 + d1K + d2zm + d3τ (2.23)
where
zi = k + [r(K)k + w(K)εi] (1− τ) + T (2.24)
In Table (2.7) we display the parameter values for the laws of motion. The
equilibrium income effective steady state tax rate from this sequential equilibrium
is 0.4562.
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Variable K ′ z′ τ ′
Constant 0.13 0.15 0.33
(6.64e-08) (5.54e-05) (1.79e-04)
K 0.94 0.10 -0.10
(1.08e-07) (9.07e-05) (3.22e-04)
z -1.39e-02 0.78 0.16
(1.79e-07) (1.49e-04) (5.28e-04)
τ -6.63e-02 6.36e-03 0.12
(1.19e-07) (9.98e-05) (3.70e-04)
R2 0.999 0.998 0.892
Table 2.7: Equilibrium Laws of Motion
To illustrate the importance of using another moment like median resources,
we solved the PRCE equilibrium without the law of motion (2.22) and with a2 = 0
in (2.21) and d2 = 0 in (2.23). Notice that the goodness of fit (measured by R2)
falls substantially for the law of motion of taxes (2.23) in Table (2.8).
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Table 2.8: Imperfect Equilibrium Laws of Motion
2.8 Concluding Remarks
At election time, the median voter mechanism assumes all agents vote. However,
evidence shows that voter turnout varies across income quintiles. Table 2.9 displays
voter turnout in the U.S. by income quintiles during the presidential elections of
years 1980 and 1996 (the closest years to what we considered above). The values in
the second and third columns of this Table correspond to the percentage of agents in
each quintile that voted in a particular year. Notice that voter turnout is positively
correlated with an agent’s position in the income distribution and that there are not
significant changes in observed voter turnout by quintile from 1980 to 1996.
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1980 1996
Income Quintile qi % of qi % of qi




q5 (highest) 81 79
Table 2.9: Voter Turnout in Presidential Election by Income Quintile
While we do not have a model of voter turnout, here we simply consider
what the observed voter turnout would imply for tax choices in our model. Specif-
ically, since more rich people vote, one would expect that the equilibrium tax rate
would reflect their numbers (i.e. we might expect lower taxes). Since our model
overpredicts the average effective tax rate, this could in principle help to match the
data.22
22That is, including a mechanism with more realistic weights (similar to those in Table 2.9), could
help solve this problem by giving more power to voters in higher income quintiles. It is important
to note that even if the above weights were consistent on-the-equilibrium path, off-the-equilibrium
path weights could be very different from those in Table 2.9).
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Chapter 3
Investment and Firm Dynamics
3.1 Introduction
Empirical studies have shown that firm size and growth are not independent for man-
ufacturing firms in the U.S.. Evans (1987) and Hall(1987) show that the growth rate
of employment of manufacturing firms, and the volatility of growth, are negatively
related to firm size and age. Dunne et al. (1988) study U.S. manufacturing plants
and show that the output of an entrant is considerably smaller than that of an av-
erage incumbent. Evans (1987) also finds that firm growth decreases with firm age
and that this relation remains after conditioning on firms’ size, and that firm growth
decreases with firm size even when firms’ age is held constant. Davis, Haltiwanger
and Schuh (1996) show that the rates of job creation and job destruction in U.S.
manufacturing plants are decreasing in age and size and that conditional on the
initial size, small establishments grow faster than large firms. Thus, the empirical
regularities1 of firm dynamics are:
1Some of these empirical facts are shown using establishment data while others correspond to
firm-level data. However, many of the empirical facts based on firm data also hold for single-unit
establishments (i.e. establishments that are firms) and small establishments (see Evans (1987)).
Moreover, a recent study by Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2006) showed that the firm and establish-
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(i) Firm growth decreases with firm age and size.
(ii) The variability of firm growth decreases with firm age and size.
(iii) Job creation and destruction2 decrease with firm age and size.
(iv) Size dependence and age dependence:
• Size dependence: Conditional on age, the dynamics of firms (growth,
volatility of growth and job creation and destruction) are negatively re-
lated to size;
• Age dependence: Conditional on size, the dynamics of firms (growth,
volatility of growth and job creation and destruction) are negatively re-
lated to age.
It seems natural to link patterns of firm growth and job reallocation with
their capital accumulation decision. In this paper, I ask whether a model of capital
accumulation with adjustment costs and entry and exit, parameterized to match the
investment regularities of U.S. manufacturing firms, is capable of generating size and
age dependence. The main point of the paper is that this model is able to account
for the conditional age and size dependence that Cooley and Quadrini (2001) model
as arising from financial frictions.
Motivated by evidence showing that non-convexities and irreversibility play
a central role in the investment process I extend a standard model of firm dynamics
to include non-convex capital adjustment costs. The primary basis for this view is
plant level evidence of a non-linear relationship between investment and measures of
ment size distributions are similar, reflecting the fact that only the very largest firms possess more
than a single plant. This paper focuses on the technology of a single production unit and does not
address questions of ownership or control.
2Following Davis et. at. (1996) job creation is defined as the sum of employment gains of
expanding firms and job destruction is the sum of employment losses of contracting firms.
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fundamentals, including investment bursts as well as periods of inaction3. Moreover,
as plant size increases, investment expenditures become smoother.
The results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, I show that in
the stationary equilibrium a model of firm dynamics with entry and exit can capture
the main investment characteristics of U.S. manufacturing firms. In particular, I
observe that the model investment rate distribution has a considerable mass around
zero, that smaller firms invest more and that as plant size increases, investment
expenditures become smoother. I then show that the combination of a standard
model of investment with adjustment costs and the introduction of entry and exit
can generate the simultaneous dependence of industry dynamics on size (once we
condition on age) and on age (once we condition on size).
In this paper, I argue that there is no conclusive evidence that financial
frictions are a necessary condition to replicate the age and size dependence. I also
show that a model, in which only friction is non-convex capital adjustment costs
is capable of generating the relation between investment rates, a measure of the
value of the firm (Tobin’s Q) and profit rates observed in the data. Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) were the first to capture the size and age dependence, linking the
patterns of firm growth with financial frictions. However, the dynamics of their
model are driven by the assumption that new entrants are of the highest productivity
level, contradicting the fact that entrants are initially less capital-intensive and less
profitable than incumbents. Moreover, in Cooley and Quadrini (2001), firms’ capital
dynamics are at odds with the investment behavior observed in the data.
The literature on capital accumulation has found that the standard assump-
tions of the neoclassical model of the firm, such as strictly convex adjustment costs
and reversibility, fail to explain investment behavior adequately (see Abel and Eberly
(1994, 1996), Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995), Caballero and Engel (1999),
3Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) documented these facts at the plant level and Becker et. al.
(2005) at a higher level of aggregation.
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Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999), Doms and
Dunne (1994) for example). Motivated by the disappointing empirical evidence,
other economists have argued in favor of the existence of non-convexities. The
sources of the speculated non-convexities in the cost of capital adjustment include
decreasing returns, the cost of equipment, costs associated with disruption and in-
stallation costs. The adjustment cost function in this paperincludes not only the
traditional convex cost term but also a non-convex cost of investment associated
with the level of profitability in periods of adjustment.
In this model, firms are characterized by their capital stock and productiv-
ity level. The optimal decision rules and the evolution of the idiosyncratic shocks
generate an endogenous distribution of establishments across capital, productivity
and age. The size dependence derives from the standard conditions of optimal in-
vestment and labor decisions in this environment, in which an abundance of capital
leads to low rates of return and slower accumulation, while a relatively small stock
of capital leads to higher returns and lower variability of future profits resulting in
higher investment rates. Hence, small firms will grow faster than large firms. The
age dependence is driven by the technological composition of firms in each age class.
The distribution of entrants and the persistence of the productivity level play a de-
cisive role. As a cohort of entrants gets older the persistence parameter defines how
fast the distribution of these firms across shocks becomes equal to the stationary
distribution. An initial distribution that differs from the ergodic distribution and a
low persistence parameter increases the chances of the model of getting the right age
dependence. We calibrate the stochastic process so that the model can reproduce
the main investment facts and the relative size of entrants for U.S. firms.
Besides Cooley and Quadrini (2001), a number of authors have tried to ex-
plain the relation between size, age and firm dynamics as arising from persistent
idiosyncratic shocks to firms’ production technology or from learning by doing.
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This literature includes the models studied by Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992),
Campbell and Fisher (2000), Alburquerque and Hopenhayn (2002), Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2006) and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2006). These models can gen-
erate an unconditional dependence of the firm dynamics on size and age. In other
words, as Cooley and Quadrini (2001) indicated, without conditioning on age, firm
dynamics are negatively related to firm size, and without conditioning on size, firm
dynamics are negatively related to firm age. However, they cannot account simul-
taneously for the conditional dependence on both size and age. My paper is also
related to the earlier work of Castro, Clementi and Corbae (2005). Their paper tries
to discriminate between two models of firm dynamics: (i) a learning model (sym-
metric and incomplete information) and (ii) a moral hazard model (asymmetric
information). They assess whether informational frictions can successfully explain
the conditional moments of firm dynamics in a model that also incorporates fixed
and convex adjustment costs. Boyarchenko (2006) constructs a model of a compet-
itive industry equilibrium refining the work of Dixit and Pindyck (1996) to study
the implications of capital irreversibilities in continuous time where investment is
made in several stages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section (3.2) I describe the
model and derive the conditions needed to find the stationary distribution. Section
(3.5) presents the calibration and the computation of the model. In Section (3.6)
I show the unconditional moments of firms’ dynamics. Section (3.7) describes the
main result of the paper, the size and age dependence. Finally, in Section(3.8) we
conclude.
3.2 Environment
The environment is a simplified version of the model developed by Hopenhayn (1992)
augmented to include capital accumulation and adjustment costs. The only source
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of uncertainty for firms currently in operation is the specific productivity shock.
Incumbent firms maximize the expected present value of discounted profits and in
every period decide the optimal production plan. The framework described below is
designed for the purpose of studying a competitive economy that is in a stationary
or long-run equilibrium. In this equilibrium some firms will be undergoing change
over time, with some expanding, others contracting, some exiting the market and
others starting up. Despite all these changes at the level of the individual firm,
aggregate variables will be constant over time.
The firm4 produces output yt per time period with a production technology
yt = f(st, kt, nt) = stkαt n
γ
t , (3.1)
with α ∈ (0, 1), γ ∈ (0, 1), where st is the idiosyncratic productivity shock, kt is
the stock of capital that the firm employs in period t and nt is the labor input.
Realizations of the idiosyncratic productivity shock s take values in the set S ≡
{s1, . . . , sns} with ns finite. The process of st is assumed to follow a First Order
Markov Process with transition matrix Π(s′|s) and to be iid across firms. This
implies that there is no uncertainty over the aggregate state of the economy even
though there is uncertainty at the individual level. Denote πs′,s = Pr(st+1 = s′|st =
s) as the probability of receiving s′ in period t+1 given that period t shock is equal
to s. For each value of s, the vector Π(·|s) represents the distribution of future
values of the shock, s′. It is assumed (as in Cooley and Quadrini (2001)) that active
firms face a probability of receiving a shock st = 0 denoted by πx. Moreover, once
st reaches this value there is zero probability that st will receive a positive value in
the future. Given these assumptions it is natural to identify a zero value for the
productivity shock with the death of a firm.




The operative profits of an active plant are given by
P (st, kt, nt) = f(kt, nt, st)− wnt (3.2)
After observing the productivity shock and making the labor decision, every
continuing plant decides the optimal level of investment
it = kt+1 − (1− δ)kt.
We normalize the price of new capital to 1 and denote the selling price of capital by
ps. Following the literature on plant dynamics, we assume that to modify the level
of capital the plant must incur adjustment costs. The function g(kt, kt+1) captures










kt, if it 6= 0,
0, if it = 0;
For values of it 6= 0, the first term in g(kt, kt+1) captures the disruption costs
associated with the installation of new capital. A fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of the operating
profits is lost in the period of adjustment. Empirical studies (see for example Power
(1998)) provide evidence that plant productivity is lower during periods of large
investment. Note that ceteris paribus, investment rates are lower in periods of low
productivity. The last term is the traditional convex adjustment cost.
The establishment’s objective is to maximize the discounted present value of
profits by choosing the optimal level of investment. The timing within period t for
a plant that produced in period t− 1 is as follows: First, the exit shock is realized.
If the firm has to exit, it collects its capital and stops producing for ever. If not, the
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idiosyncratic productivity level is realized. Second, active plants decide the optimal
level of labor input and the investment decision. Before the period ends, the firm
receives profits net of adjustment costs (if any).
3.2.2 Entry Decision
I assume that there is a continuum of ex-ante identical potential entrants in each
period. Entrants incur a one time fixed cost κe denominated in units of output. The
price of capital at the entry stage is denoted by ce. Each potential entrant receives
its initial shock from a continuous distribution ν(s). The size and the distribution
of entrants will play an important role in the dynamics of firms. The determinants
of this relation will be explained in more detail later.
It is assumed that in this economy there is free entry. The timing of events
before entry is as follows: First, the potential entrant observes the costs of creating
a new firm and then decides to enter or not. Second, if he decides to enter, the
entrepreneur pays the fixed entry cost and makes the initial investment ke.
3.3 Recursive Formulation
3.3.1 Incumbent Firm’s Problem




















1−γ − γ 11−γ
]
and θ = α1−γ . Then, by evaluating the profit
function P (k, n, s) at the optimal labor decision n(k, s), I can derive the operating
profit of the plant (as a function of k and a), R(k, a), as follows:
R(k, a) ≡ P (k, n(k, s), s) = akθ. (3.4)
For notational simplification and ease in the exposition, I will write the problem of
the firm as a function of the variable a. The transition probabilities will be denoted
by Π(a, a′) and the entrant probability distribution by ν(a). The curvature of the
profit function, θ, is particularly important for obtaining size dependence.5 For
future reference, it is convenient to redefine the optimal labor decision as a function
of the variable a. Let φ = ( γ1−γ )
1
w . After some simple algebra, I derive that optimal
labor at state (k, a) is:
n(k, a) = φakθ. (3.5)
The recursive problem of the active plant is:
V (k, a) = max
{
V b(k, a), V s(k, a), V i(k, a)
}
(3.6)
where V b(k, a) represents the value of “buying” more capital, V s(k, a) corresponds
to the value of “selling” capital and finally V i(k, a), inaction, is the value of keeping
the depreciated capital stock for the future period.
5This profit function can also be derived from an environment where the firm faces a downward-
sloping demand function and has a Cobb-Douglas constant return to scale production function.
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The value of buying capital is:
V b(k, a) = max
k′∈(k(1−δ),k̄]
{








V (k′, a′)Π(a, a′) + πxpsk′
]}
.
The value of selling capital is:
V s(k, a) = max
k′∈[0,k(1−δ))
{








V (k′, a′)Π(a, a′) + πxpsk′
]}
.
where ps ≤ 1 represents the selling price of capital.
Finally the value of inaction is given by:







V (k(1− δ), a′)Π(a, a′) + πxpsk(1− δ)
]
.(3.9)
Note that in this last case the future value of capital is given by the depre-
ciated capital stock after production in the current period.
3.3.2 Entry Decision
Entrants incur in a one time fixed cost κe denominated in units of output. The price
of capital at the entry stage is denoted by ce. Each potential entrant receives its
initial shock from a continuous distribution ν(a). The initial investment ke is the
solution to:











For future reference, I define the value of creating a firm as follows:




V (ke, a′)ν(a′)− ceke − κe. (3.11)
In this partial equilibrium analysis, with fixed prices, the mass of new entrant
firms is non-degenerate only if the surplus from creating a new firm is zero, that is:





= ceke + κe. (3.12)
If the last condition holds with equality an equilibrium with positive measure of
entrants will exist. By the properties of the value function that solves problem
(3.6), the solution to (3.10) exists and it is unique. I do not conduct a general
equilibrium analysis, but the entry of new firms will induce changes in prices (in
particular in the wage rate) and in the value of the firm until there are no gains
from creating a new firm.
I will focus the attention in the stationary distribution to study the long run
properties of the model with adjustment costs. The stationary equilibrium implies a
size and age distribution of firms. We provide conditions under which the empirical
regularities hold.
3.4 Stationary Distribution
The only uncertainty in the model is generated by the idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. At each point in time t the economy is characterized by a measure of firms
Γt(k, a, j) for each level of capital stock k ∈ K = [0, k̄], productivity shocks a ∈ A =
{a1, . . . , ana} and age of the firms j ∈ Υ = {1, 2, 3, . . .}. A discussion of the definition
of the set K is in order. We will look for a stationary measure of firms, and this
requires that firms never accumulate capital beyond some endogeneously determined
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level k̄. Intuitively the value of k̄ is where the decision rule k′(k, ana) crosses the 45◦
line, provided that the optimal capital accumulation rule is an increasing function
of a. Conditions under which firms optimally decide to do this are given in the
quantitative section.
With a positive probability of receiving a = 0 in any given period, the ex-
pected age of exit is finite. If we let the measure of firms at age j be given by µj ,
then µj+1 = (1−πx)µj , where the measure µ0 is given and corresponds to the mass
of new entrants.
Let B(K) and B(Υ) be the Borel σ−algebra of K and Υ respectively, and
P(A) the power set of A. Define X = K×A×Υ. Let X = B(K)×P(A)×B(Υ)
and M be the set of all finite measures over the measurable space (X,X ).
The law of motion of Γt(k, a, j) is given by:
Γt+1 = Ht(Γt), (3.13)
where the function Ht can be written explicitly as:
a. For all T such that 1 /∈ T :
Γt+1(K ×A× T ) =
∫
Mt((k, a, j);K ×A× T ) Γt(dk × da× dj), (3.14)
where




Π(a, a′)(1− πx) if k′(k, a) ∈ K
0 else
b.




ν(a)E if ke ∈ K
0 else
where E corresponds to the mass of entrants.
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The explicit formulation of the law of motion for the distribution has to be divided
in two parts in order to capture the assumption that entrant firms start their lives
with capital value ke.
This paper focuses on the study of the invariant distribution of firms denoted
by Γ∗. We find Γ∗ as the fixed point of this mapping, that is, Γ∗ = H(Γ∗). We
normalize the measure of firms to one. The mass of entrants, E, will coincide with
the mass of firms that exit the market, i.e. E = πxΓ∗. In this way the total
mass of firms is constant. Stokey and Lucas (1989) state the necessary conditions
for convergence of the measure Γ. The properties of the stochastic process and the
decision rules give rise to a mapping from the current distribution to the next period
measure of firms. An invariant measure of firms Γ∗ exists. Moreover, Γ∗ is unique,
and the sequence of measures generated by the transition function, {Hn(Γ0)}∞n=0
converges weakly to Γ∗ from any arbitrary Γ0. This result will allow me to calibrate
the model using the stationary distribution and the moments from data on the U.S.
manufacturing sector to then test the model implications for the conditional size
and age dependence.
3.5 Matching Investment Moments
In this section, I parameterize the model to match the investment dynamics observed
in the U.S. manufacturing sector. I assume that a model period is one year. To
solve the firm’s problem, I approximate the value function using cubic splines and the
optimal capital accumulation is obtained by a root finding algorithm. I assume that
the firm’s idiosyncratic shocks (defined as in equation (3.4)) follow an autoregressive
form given by
ln(ai,t) = ρa ln(ai,t−1) + ut (3.15)
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with ut ∼ N(0, σu) and |ρ| < 1. Denote the standard deviation of log(a) by
σa = σu/
√
(1− ρ2). To solve the model, I will approximate the distribution of
the idiosyncratic shocks using the method proposed by Tauchen and Hussey (1991)
and choosing the number of grid points for a to be equal to 21.
The distribution of entrants and their initial level of investment are key
elements in the analysis. I assume that the entry shocks are distributed in the same
way as the innovation term in 3.15. In particular, ν(a) is the log-normal distribution,
i.e. the log of an entrant’s productivity shock, ln(a), is distributed N(0, σu). The
parameters of the productivity process can be chosen to match the profile of US
firms. They have implications for the degree of persistence and dispersion in the
distribution of firms. The size of entrants is determined by the entry costs and
the distribution of entry shocks. The general pattern observed is that entering
firms are substantially smaller on average than existing or continuing firms and that
organization learning appears to continue over a period of at least 10 years.
The set of parameters necessary in order to compute the model are:
Θ = {δ, θ, γ, ρa, σa, λ, ps, ψ, ce, φ}, (3.16)
where δ is the depreciation rate, θ is the curvature of the production function,
γ is the corresponding labor share, ρa and σa are the parameters that define the
idiosyncratic shocks, λ is the parameter that captures the disruption costs associated
with capital adjustment, ps is the relative price of used capital to new capital, ψ
is the weight in the convex adjustment cost, and ce is the corresponding variable
entry cost.6 Since the productivity process estimated is that of the variable a, in
what follows, the value of the entry cost κe is such that the arbitrage condition 3.12
is satisfied and φ is set such that the average number of workers in the economy is
6Recall that θ = α
1−γ , so after setting the parameters θ and γ, the value of α can be derived as
α = θ(1− γ).
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consistent with the data. This implies that φ is chosen so that the average number












is equal to 65 as reported by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990). Once I set the value of
φ, for a given γ, the wage rate w can be determined.
The exercise consists of choosing the parameters in order to match the long-
run moments from the U.S. economy and the investment dynamics to then test the
model against the size and age dependence moments. I set the risk free rate to 4
percent which corresponds to the average yearly real return on a five year T-bill
sin 1980. I set the depreciation rate to be 0.11. Also, the labor-share parameter
γ = 0.64 is in turn selected to replicate the labor share in the NIPA.
The exit probability is calibrated to πx = 0.045 because in the sample ana-
lyzed by Evans (1987), the average probability of exit is about 4.5 percent.
To find the remaining parameters it is necessary to solve the model. The set
of moments and parameters are jointly determined. The calibration of the curvature
of the production function (3.4) is not straightforward in the presence of adjustment
costs that interact with the profit function. Following Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006), a two step procedure is used to calibrate the value of θ that is consistent
with the observed curvature of the production function at the plant level in the data.
Using the assumed productivity shocks, equation (3.15), taking logs of the revenue
function, equation (3.4) and quasi-differencing yields
log(Rt) = ρa log(Rt−1)− ρaθ log(kt−1) + θ log(kt) + ut. (3.17)
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) estimated this equation via generalized method
of moments using a complete set of time dummies and lagged and twice-lagged cap-
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ital and twice-lagged profits as instruments. The data come from the Longitudinal
Research Database consisting of approximately 7000 large manufacturing plants that
were in operation between 1972 and 1988. Their estimate of θ is 0.592. The two
step procedure consists of setting θ, ρa and σa at some value and then calibrating
the other parameters to match the corresponding moments. After this is done, the
model is simulated to estimate equation (3.17) to recover the value of θ and ρa that
is consistent with active establishments in the model. If the estimates coincide with
the values of the parameters in the actual data I stop, if not I update θ and repeat
the process. The parameters ρa and σa are taken directly from the Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006) estimation with disruption costs and after controlling for a time
fixed effect.
The parameters associated with the adjustment cost function (λ and ψ),
the selling price of capital (ps) and the entrants’ price of capital (ce) are chosen
so plants in the stationary distribution display the patterns documented in Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006) (investment facts) and Dunne, et. al. (1988) (entrant’s
main characteristics). The main findings of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)can be
summarized as follows: first, plants exhibit significant inaction in terms of capital
adjustment (8.10 % of the total observations have investment rates of less than 1% in
absolute value). Second, periods of inaction are complemented by periods of rather
intensive adjustment of the capital stock. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) (and many
others) define a spike as an investment episode in excess of 20 %. Negative spikes are
found in 1.8 percent of the observations. The correlation between investment rates
and profitability shocks is 0.143 in the data. The model does not include aggregate
shocks and these moments are averages across time and affected by business cycle
fluctuations. However, these movements are found to be small.
Dunne et. al. (1988) report that entrants that create a firm by building
a new plant have market share of 10.4% and their relative size is 28.35% of the
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average firm.78 This study summarizes the patterns of firm entry, growth and exit
in four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries over the period 1963-1982. Entrants
are disaggregated into new firms, existing firms that diversify into an industry by
opening new production facilities, and existing firms that enter by altering the mix
of outputs they produce.
The full set of parameter values is reported in Table (3.5). The curvature of
the production function θ is equal to 0.604. This implies that the capital share α
is equal to 0.2174 (Fuentes, Gilchrist and Rysman (2006), Gomes (2001) and Hen-
nessy and Whited (2005) obtained similar estimates9 in related studies). The selling
price of capital is smaller than the price of buying new capital by approximately
1%. This wedge between the prices is in part responsible for the inaction that the
model generates. The disruption cost is around 15% of current profits in periods of
adjustment. Given the value of ψ, firms with high enough levels of capital will find
it optimal to reduce the scale of production and do not wait until the depreciation
process takes all the excess. Moreover, given the combination of adjustment costs
present in the model, firms will wait until the productivity shock is high enough
to increase the capital stock up to the optimal level and we will observe the bursts
of investment that are documented in the literature. To have a better sense of the
magnitude of these parameters, the average adjustment cost paid relative to the
capital stock was 4% in the stationary distribution. The calibrated value of ce is
1.41 and implies that the cost of buying new capital is around three times of the
7Their study is based on Census data that is available every 5 years. For that reason the market
share in the model corresponds to the ratio of total output produced by firms of age 1 through 5
over total output of older firms.
8The relative size is computed as the ratio of average output of entrants over average output of
older firms (see previous footnote).
9This parameter value also produces an equilibrium capital-output ratio consistent with the US
economy when the empirical counterpart for capital is identified with plant and equipment and is
associated in NIPA with nonresidential investment.
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price active plants face.
Parameter Value Moment Value
Discount Rate r 0.04 U.S. Data
Depreciation Rate δ 0.07 LRD Plants
Labor Share γ 0.64 NIPA
Exit Probability πx 0.045 Observed exit probability
Autocorrelation ρa 0.885 LRD Plants
Std. Dev. of a σa 0.64 LRD Plants
Capital Share θ 0.604 Establishments LRD
Disruption Cost λ 0.882 Average Investment Rate 12.2%
Selling Price ps 0.988 Fraction Spike (-) 1.8%
Convex Cost ψ 0.112 Corr (i, a) 14.3%
Entry Cost ce 1.41 Entrants Market Share 10.4%
φ 9.87 Average Employment 62
Table 3.1: Model parameters
3.6 Firm Dynamics and Stationary distribution
In this section, I describe the firm dynamics generated by the calibrated model of
adjustment costs at the stationary distribution. The intuition behind firm’s behavior
is provided in Figure 3.1 which shows the value of the firm, the optimal investmet
decision rule, the labor choice and Tobin’s Q for different combinations of firm’s
capital size and idiosyncratic shocks.
The value of the firm is strictly increasing in firm’s size (capital). As a result
of decreasing returns to scale, the marginal increase in value is decreasing in k. This
implies that for low values of k the marginal benefit of investment is higher and the
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firm will prefer to invest in new capital. On the contrary, everything else equal, for
high values of k it will prefer to sell some of its capital stock and reduce the scale
of production.







































































Figure 3.1: Firm Behavior
Figure 3.1.b shows the optimal capital accumulation of the firm for low (aL),
medium (aM ) and high (aH) values of a. We observe that k′(k, a) is strictly in-
creasing in k and s. For low values of k, k′(k, a) > k(1 − δ) that is, i > 0. There
are middle range values of k where k′(k, a) coincides with k(1− δ). In this case the
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combination of k and s are such that the firm prefers not to invest. Finally, for
high values of k, investment is negative, that is the firm is selling some portion of its
capital at price ps when the marginal product of one extra unit of capital is less than
the marginal benefit of selling it. This pattern can be associated with two invest-
ment thresholds: one that defines when to stop investing and set k′ = (1− δ)k and
another that determines when to start selling capital. This thresholds are increasing
in the productivity shock of the firm for a given current’s capital stock k. Another
feature that we can observe from this figure is the endogenous determination of k̄.
Small firms will invest in new capital as they move from low to high produc-
tivity shocks; that is, firms increase their capital stock when their future prospects
increase. Firm behavior implies that the investment rate of firms is sensitive to
the profit rate, R(k, a)/k, even after controlling for the future profitability of the
firm and this sensitivity is greater for smaller firms (see section 3.7.1 for a deeper
explanation). As pointed out in previous literature, it is possible to obtain cash-
flows effects even in the absence of financial frictions. The labor decision rule is
also depicted in Figure (3.1). This decision rule comes directly from equation (3.5).
Firm’s labor choice is strictly increasing in its capital and its productivity shock.
Now I turn to the properties of firms’ dynamics in the stationary distribu-
tion. I calibrate the model mainly to match the moments reported by Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006) and the distribution of entrants presented in Dunne, Roberts
and Samuelson (1988, page 504). The histogram of investment rates that emerges
from this economy is reported in Figure(3.2). Clearly, there is a mass of firms around
zero investment as we observe in the data (see Figure 1 in Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006) for example) and the distribution has fat tails.
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Figure 3.2: Model’s Distribution of Investment Rates
The moments from the data and those from the model in the stationary
distribution are reproduced in Table (3.2). At the calibrated parameter values the
model does a good job in reproducing the investment moments.
Moment Data Model
Spike Rate: Negative Investment (%) 1.80 1.78
Inaction Rate (%) 8.10 8.12
Correlation(I/K, a) 0.143 0.143
Entrant Relative Size (%) 28.35 28.33
Entrant Market Share (%) 10.4 10.4
Table 3.2: Data and Model Investment Moments.
As displayed in Figure (3.3), I also explore the properties of the growth rate
of capital, profit rate, the standard deviation of the growth rate and job reallocation
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rate dynamics to show that they are consistent with the observations in the U.S.
economy. These unconditional moments are computed by averaging them according
to the stationary distribution of each class of firms. At a given age, firms differ in
two dimensions: their capital stock and their productivity shock. This heterogeneity
is the driving force of all my results.
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Figure 3.3: Firm’s Moments and Invariant Distribution
The key properties of the behavior of firms that can be summarized as follows:
• Small and younger firms growth faster (Panels (a) and (b)).
• Profits rates are negatively correlated with size and age (Panels (c) and (d)).
• The variability of firm growth decreases with firm age and size (Panels (g) and
(h)).
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• Small and younger firms have higher job reallocation rates (Panels (e) and
(f)).
The growth rate of capital is plotted in Panels (a) and (b). To understand
why investment rates are a decreasing function of capital, it is necessary to under-
stand the trade-off that firms face when deciding the optimal level of capital for
the future. On the one hand, more capital allows them to increase the production
scale and increase their expected profits; on the other hand the expansion of the
production scale combined with the capital irreversibility implies a higher exposure
to the bad productivity shock. Naturally, this is a result of the diminishing returns
to scale at the establishment level. At higher levels of capital the expected profits of
increasing the size of the firm decreases. The investment behavior will be important
in explaining the relation between growth rates and cash flows. The unconditional
dependence of firm growth rates on their age comes from the fact that firms are born
small on average. As they become older they also become bigger and the intuition
is similar to the unconditional dependence of firms’ growth rate on size.
Panels (c) and (d) plot profit rates as a function of firm’s size and firm’s
age. This property derives also from the decreasing return to scale production
function and the optimal capital accumulation rule mentioned above. The higher
profitability of smaller firms implies that they have a greater incentive to reinvest
profits resulting in the pattern of investment rates observed in Panel (a). Similarly,
the relation between panel (d) and panel (b) is the driving force of the unconditional
dependence of profit rates on age.
The standard deviation of growth is also a decreasing function of size (except
for a range of small firms and age (see Panels (e) and (f)). Smaller (and younger)
firms behavior are more affected by productivity shocks than bigger (and older)
firms.
Panels (g) and (h) display the job creation rate, defined as the rate of em-
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ployment gains summed over all plants that expand at a given age or size category
(see Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996)), and the job destruction rate, defined as
the rate of employment losses summed over all plants that contract or shut down.
As pointed before, the labor decision is increasing in capital, so the dynamics of
firms’ growth stated above have a direct effect on the job creation rate of labor.
The model is capable of generating the unconditional dependence of firms’ realloca-
tion on size and age. Job reallocation, i.e. the sum of job creation and destruction is
decreasing in size and age; however, while it is possible to observe that job creation
is decreasing in size and age, job destruction is increasing for young and small firms.
Finally, Figure (3.4) plots the joint distribution of firms over size (capital
stock) and age. New entrants are of the same size; however, they make different
investment decisions according to their productivity shocks in their first period of
life. In the model studied by Cooley and Quadrini (2001) entrants are always of the
highest productivity shock. We observe a concentration of small and young firms.
This is a feature of the model that is consistent with the data even though the
model is calibrated only to match the investment facts. In the U.S. manufacturing
sector, more than 45 of new plants exit within 20 years. Furthermore, we observe
that younger firms are smaller on average.
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Figure 3.4: Stationary Distribution of Firms over Size and Age.
In summary, once calibrated to match the investment features of U.S. estab-
lishments, the model is able to generate the unconditional size and age dependence
of firms’ dynamics. Now is time to see if the model with adjustment costs and
idiosyncratic productivity shocks is also able to generate simultaneously the condi-
tional size and age dependence. Furthermore, in Section 3.7.1, I will show that the
model is consistent with the evidence that relates investment rates and cash flows.
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3.7 Size and Age Dependence.
The analysis conducted in the previous section showed that a model driven by pro-
ductivity shocks, with convex and non-convex adjustment costs, some level of capital
irreverisibility and entry and exit calibrated to the U.S. data captures many of the
salient qualitative features of industry dynamics. In particular, higher investment
rates, higher profits, higher volatility and higher job reallocation are observed for
small and young firms. However, the main point of the paper is to demonstrate
that this model is also able to account for the conditional age and size dependence
pointed by previous studies like Evans (1987), Hall (1987) and Davis et al. (1996)
that Cooley and Quadrini (2001) describe as arising from financial frictions.
Previous models of industry dynamics that consider investment decisions
were not able to generate the age and size dependence because, once you control for
the size of the firm, age becomes irrelevant in differentiating the dynamics of small
and large establishments: the dependence on age derives only from the fact that
young firms are on average smaller. In those models there exists only one dimension
of heterogeneity, and thus once you fix age or size, firms are all alike independently
of their history. In this model, there exist two dimensions of heterogeneity, be-
cause once you condition on size (capital stock depends on the previous history),
firms could also be different in the productivity composition. Furthermore, once
you condition on the level of the idiosyncratic shock, firms differ in their size and
this generates different patterns for the capital stock. To analyze how the model
behaves I create a panel of firms from the stationary distribution10, and I conduct
an econometric test to verify the relation between growth rates, profits rates, job
creation and job destruction with the size and the age of the firms. Specifically, for
each of these four variables, denoted by x, I run the following regression11 on the
10In each simulation, I simulate 10,000 firms for 2,000 periods and take the last 200 periods.
11I also tried a specification with higher order terms and the results were similar.
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simulated data
xj,t = a0 + a1 ln(sizej,t) + a2 ln(agej,t) + εt. (3.18)
The subscript j denotes firm j and t corresponds to the time period. As before,
firm’s size is measure with the stock of capital. The results of this test are displayed
in Table (3.3).
Growth Rate Profit Rate Job Creation Job Destruction
Constant 2.0872 0.7558 0.2800 0.2785
(1.32e− 03) (2.11e− 04) (2.32e− 04) (5.85e− 03)
Size -0.2806 -0.0371 -0.0096 -0.0463
(4.87e− 05) (9.29e− 05) (1.49e− 06) (1.73e− 05)
Age -0.3350 -0.1070 -0.0431 -0.0391
(1.18e− 04) (5.67e− 05) (7.24e− 05) (8.26e− 06)
Table 3.3: Model Predictions (Std Dev in parenthesis)
The elasticities of growth, profit rates, job creation and job destruction with
respect to size and age are negative. Therefore, firm growth profit rates, job creation
and job destruction decrease with firm size when firm age is held constant and
decrease with firm age when size is held constant. Every decision of the firm depends
on its level of capital stock as well as its productivity shock. Two firms with the same
productivity shock will decide to invest, disinvest or continue with the same scale of
production according to their level of k. Different values of k reflects the different
histories. Similarly, two firms with the same scale of production will invest different
amounts of capital according to their current value of s. The heterogeneous behavior
of firms in the stationary distribution introduces the age and size dependence.
Even though the model was parameterized only to match the investment
moments it reproduces also the quantitative results in the literature relating firms
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dynamics conditional on size and age. Evans (1987) finds that the elasticity of
growth rates with respect to size is -0.0374 and with respect to age is -0.0381. That
is, as in the model, firm growth decreases with firm size when firm age is held
constant and decreases with firm age when firm size is held constant.
The conditional size dependence derives from the same factors that affected
the unconditional relation between firms’ evolution and size. The higher growth
rates of small firms is related with their higher profit rates and higher value of
Tobin’s q. This also introduces a negative relation with the rates of job reallocation
(creation and destruction). As explained in the previous section, this behavior is
directly connected with the decreasing returns to scale production function. Smaller
firms perceive a higher marginal benefit of investing in new capital and consequently
their growth rates are higher. A similar intuition applies for the rest of the variables.
The age dependence is driven by the heterogenous technological composition
of firms of different ages classes. Conditional on their size, firms with higher pro-
ductivity shocks experience higher rates of profits than firms with lower values of
s. Conditional on the size of the firms, the distribution across productivity shocks
differs as we move from younger to older firms. As a result, younger firms grow
faster and face higher rates of job creation and failure than older firms.
Using the results from Table 3.3, in Figures (3.5) and (3.6) I plot the growth
rate of firms, their profit rate, job creation and job destruction rates as functions
of the firms’ size (conditional on age) and as a function of age (conditional on size)
respectively. We can conclude that in the stationary distribution all variables are
decreasing in the size and in the age of the firm, even after controlling, respectively
for age and size.
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Figure 3.5: Size Dependence (Firms’ Dynamics Conditional on Age).
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Figure 3.6: Age Dependence (Firms’ Dynamics Conditional on Size).
The heterogeneity just described plays the most important role in generating
the age dependence in the economy. This heterogeneity is derived from the distri-
bution of shocks from where entrants draw their shock in the first period but more
importantly from the persistence that idiosyncratic shocks display in the model. If
the shocks present a high autocorrelation, the heterogenous composition is main-
tained for long periods, that is if ρa is close to one, the distribution of entrants ν(s)
will shape the distribution of active firms for a long time. In the limit, if ρa → 1
the distribution over shocks of active firms will be similar to ν(s). On the contrary,
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as ρa → 0 only the distribution of very young firms will remain close to their ini-
tial distribution. To make it clearer consider the following example: assume that
there are no disruption costs associated with adjusting the capital stock and πx = 0.
Then, the Euler equation of an active firm after substituting the envelope condition
is
−1− gk′(k, k′) + 1(1 + r)
[ ∑
s′
Π(s′|s)Rk′(s′, k′) + (1− δk′) + gk(k′, k′′)
]
= 0
⇒ 1 + gk′(k, k′) = 1(1 + r)
[∑
s′
Π(s′|s)Rk′(s′, k′) + (1− δk′) + gk(k′, k′′)
]
(3.19)
This is the usual capital accumulation equation of a firm where the left hand side
represent the marginal costs and the left hand side represents the marginal bene-
fits of investment. Consider the extreme case where shocks are iid and distributed
according to the stationary distribution corresponding with Π. Denote this distri-
bution with Π∗. In this world only the shocks of entrants will depend on ν(s). For
any firm with age greater or equal to 2, the shocks will be drawn from Π∗. Then
the capital accumulation equation becomes





Π∗(s′)Rk′(s′, k′) + (1− δk′) + gk(k′, k′′)
]
(3.20)
that is independent of s. Thus, once you condition on size, the capital accumulation
of the firm is independent of the shock and then firms with different ages will behave
as identical firms conditional on the capital stock. The distribution of firms for active
plants that are not entrants is the same across shocks.
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(a) Unconditional Productivity Distribution (iid case)



















(b) Uncondtional Productivity Distribution (Persistent case)














Figure 3.7: Distribution of firms over shocks for different ages
If you add some level of persistence, not only the decision of the firm will
depend on the idiosyncratic shock, but also the distribution of firms across shocks
will differ for firms with different ages. The optimal capital investment is the solution
to problem (3.6). The measure of active firms with a particular shock will approach
Π∗(s) as you consider older firms. Figure 3.7 display the distribution over shocks
for different age values. In the iid case the differences in technology composition
disappears after the first period. In the persistent case, these differences are present
for firms with more than 20 years of life.
In Figure 3.7 each line corresponds to a different age and in the iid case only
two lines can be distinguished. After the first year of production, the distribution of
firms over s is the same across firms with different ages. For the case where the shocks
are persistent, the technological differences prevail for a long time. Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) needed to assume that the entrants were of a particular technology
type to generate the right sign in the age dependence (see Cooley and Quadrini
(2001) page 1303). In our model, the size of the entrants as well as the entry barrier
are calibrated to match the facts observed in the U.S. manufacturing sector.
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3.7.1 Evidence on Financial Constraints
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) motivated the introduction of financial constraints in a
standard model of firm dynamics pointing to the relation between investment rates
and Tobin’s Q and cash flows. However, there are theoretical arguments and empiri-
cal evidence showing that investment-cash flows sensitivities are not good indicators
of financing constraints or financial frictions. Cooper and Ejarque (2001) find that
the sensitivity of investment rates to cash flows does necessarily comes from a model
with financial constraints. They estimate different models of capital investment to
match the “Q-theory” regressions and obtain a better fit with a model with no fi-
nancial frictions. Moreover, Erickson and Whited (2000) and Gomes (2001) argue
that the relation between investment rates and Tobin’s q comes from measurement
error. In my model, the monotonicity of the investment function imply that invest-
ment of firms is sensitive to cash flows generating the significant relation obtain in
the data. To show this I simulate my model economy and apply the same econo-
metric procedures that previous studies pointing to financial constraints used. The
estimated model takes the following form
ij,t
kt




where the subscript j denotes firm j and t corresponds to the time period. A
significant coefficient a2 in this type of regression motivated the inclusion of financial
constraints. The results from my model are displayed in Table (3.4).
Coefficient Value Std. Error
Tobin’s Q 0.087 1.92e-06
Profit Rate 2.95 5.71e-04
Table 3.4: Model Predictions.
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The values obtained are in line with the estimated coefficients reported by
Gomes (2001) and Cooper and Ejarque (2001). The goal of this exercise was to
understand the “cash-flow effect” and the relation with financial constraints. We
observe that a model with no financial frictions and only some level of capital ir-
reversibility also generates a significant “cash flow” coefficient. This is not an ar-
gument against financial frictions. I do not question the existence or importance
of these constraints for investment decisions. Nevertheless, this result cast serious
doubt on the common interpretation of cash-flow effects as evidence in favor of
financing constraints.
Hence, the integration of a basic model of industry dynamics with non-convex
adjustment costs and entry and exit is able to capture most of the stylized facts
about the investment behavior and the growth of firms. In particular, we are able
to reproduce the conditional age and size dependence that the empirical literature
pointed before and that previous models of investment and firms’ dynamics were
not able to obtain. In contrast with previous models were financial frictions were
necessary to address this question we developed a model were the friction present
is the adjustment costs of capital accumulation.
3.8 Conclusion
Models of firm and industry dynamics that consider entry and exit were unable to
account simultaneously for the conditional dependence of firm growth, standard de-
viation of growth and job reallocation on size and age. Cooley and Quadrini (2001)
point out that one possible explanation could be the introduction of financial fric-
tions in an otherwise standard model. They show that the integration of persistent
shocks and financial-market frictions allows the model to generate the desired firm
dynamics. In this paper, I argued that a model of investment dynamics with ad-
justment costs that introduces entry and exit can also account for the conditional
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size and age dependence.
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